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MASS TORTS: AN INSTITUTIONAL
EVOLUTIONIST PERSPECTIVE
PeterH. Schuckt

INTRODUCTION

With the benefit of twenty-five years' experience of mass tort litigation,' it is time to assess what we have learned. Torts scholars have
already arrived at a consensus as telling as it is rare: Although courts
have demonstrated considerable resourcefulness in struggling with
mass torts issues, the overall performance of the litigation system in
this area has been remarkably poor.2 Some proceduralists have voiced
similar criticisms; generally speaking, however, procedure scholars
seem to be more confident than torts scholars that reform can be act Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Visiting Professor, New York
University School of Law (Fall 1994). The author thanks Richard Marcus, Geoffrey Miller,
Judith Resnik, Paul Rheingold, and the participants at a faculty workshop at NYU and Yale
Law Schools for their comments on an earlier version.
1 A recent article emphasizes three distinctive features of mass tort litigation: "the
large number of claims associated with a single 'litigation'; the commonality of issues and
actors among claims within the litigation; and the interdependence of claim values."
Deborah R.Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass PersonalInjuyy Litigation: A
Sodo-LegalAnalysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 965 (1993). Such definitions usually stress the
difficulty of establishing causal responsibility in most, but not all, mass tort actions. This
difficulty may arise for any of a number of reasons: claimants' injuries are separated in
time and space from their exposures; a number of possible natural and human causes of
the injuries exist; particular defendants are not clearly linked to particular plaintiffs; the
claims have contacts with a variety ofjurisdictions; and other complicating factors. For one
taxonomy of mass torts, see JACK B. WErNsTIN, INDIMDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITICATIONs: THE EFFECT OF CLASS AcrIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES

16-17 (1995).
2 This consensus extends beyond academic tort scholars to analysts at non-academic
research organizations such as the RAND Institute for Civil Justice and the Manhattan
Institute. See, e.g., Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 962-63, 1061 (arguing that the legal
system has not responded well to the challenge of mass torts); see also PETER W. HUBER,
GALILEO's REVENGE: JUST SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); WALTrR K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). It

even includes scholars such asJohn Siliciano, who has condemned other critiques of mass
tort law both for employing crisis rhetoric and for failing to specify more precisely their
benchmark tort system. SeeJohn A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990 (1995). By contrast, only a few scholars wax optimistic about the possibilities of modifying tort law to accommodate the special difficulties posed by mass tort
litigation. E.g., Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, CollectiveJustice in Tort Law, 78
VA. L REV. 1481 (1992); David Rosenberg, The CausalConnection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv.L REV. 849 (1984).
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complished within the basic tort paradigm. In law as in life, familiarity seems to breed contempt.
Torts scholars charge that mass tort litigation often produces arbitrary results; that it fails to deliver the right compensation to the
right victims when it is most needed; that it misallocates risk among
consumers, corporations, and governments; that it generates unconscionable waste; and that it does not achieve corrective justice. They
argue that the legal actors in the mass tort drama-self-serving, entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers; foot-dragging defense counsel; and
overwhelmed, desperately improvising judges-have subordinated important public goals and the needs of individual claimants to their
own interests. Notoriously convoluted proceedings enrich lawyers,
consultants, and expert witnesses while demoralizing, and often impoverishing, the law's supposed beneficiaries.
Indeed, most torts scholars regard the notion of a mass tort "system" as a misnomer, a convenient but fundamentally misleading rubric for academic conferences, journal commentaries, and occasional
texts or courses. Rather, in the dominant view, the field known as
"mass torts" comprises a melange of discrete disputes with little in
common besides their prodigious procedural complexity, stratospheric transaction costs, and abject dependence on uncertain
science.

4

Many of these criticisms seemed perfectly valid when the first generation of serious mass torts scholarship appeared about a decade
ago, 5 and some of these criticisms remain valid today-especially
those concerning the risks of injustice when plaintiffs seek essentially
unlimited compensatory and punitive damages from sympathetic juries for serious injuries on the basis of changing, easily manipulated
scientific evidence. The recent settlement of the silicone gel breast
implant settlement 6 and the flood of even weaker claims filed in the
s See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort As Public Law Litigation: ParadigmMisplaced,
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 579 (1994).
4 E.g., HUBER, supra note 2 (1991); PHANTOM RiSmc ScIENTmIc INFERENcE AND THE
LAw (K. Foster et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter PHANTOM RISK].
5
E.g., PETER H. Scisuc, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToXic DiSASTERS IN THE
COURTS (enlarged ed. 1987); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); MarkJ. Roe, Bankruptcy and
Mass Tort; 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1984); Rosenberg, supra note 2; Jack B. Weinstein, The
Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation,73 GEo. LJ. 1389 (1985).
6
There, Dow Coming and other manufacturers agreed to pay silicone gel breast
implant claimants $4.23 billion for connective-tissue and other diseases, even though these
companies knew that their causal responsibility for these diseases could not be proven.
Indeed, the best studies yet conducted on this question, released almost before the ink was
dry on the settlement agreement, failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between
breast implants and these illnesses. See Marcia Angell, Do Breast Implants Cause Systemic Disease?, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1748 (June 16, 1994) (discussing Gabriel et al. study and
others); Gina Kolata, Study FindsNo Implant-DiseaseLinks, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A18
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wake of that settlement 7 provide anecdotal but dramatic support for
the continuing force of these first-generation critiques.
Still, contemporary mass tort litigation has changed a great deal
since the torts scholars first returned this indictment Although some
others have noted many of these changes, I hope to bring them into a
somewhat sharper, more comprehensive focus. Only by abandoning

outdated views of our subject can we come to a fresh understanding of
it.
(discussing Gabriel et al., Hochberg, and other studies); Gina Kolata, Tissue Illness and
Implants: No Tie is Seen, N.Y. TimEs (National), May 29, 1994, § 1, at 16 (discussing Schottenfeld et al. study); see also PhillipJ. Hilts, 2 Studies Find No Breast-ImplantTie to ConnectiveTissue illness, N.Y. TasES (National), Oct. 26, 1994, at A23 (discussing Hochberg study);
Gina Kolata, A Case ofJustice, ora Total Travesty?, N.Y. TimEs,June 13, 1995, at D1 (reviewing
dispute); FDA Says Risk Minimal From Breast Implants, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1995, at B8
(follow-up study).
In deciding to settle, the breast implant defendants apparently dreaded the prospect
thatjuries, outraged by internal corporate documents thatjurors might interpret as showing corporate irresponsibility or illegality, might award ruinous judgments despite the weak
evidence of causation and thereby destroy the firms' goodwill in the consumer products
market. Presumably, this reaction by the defendants partly reflected the fact that the
breast implant litigation was still "immature" in the sense discussed infra part I, but "mature" enough to have produced enormous punitive damage awards. See BamabyJ. Feder, 3
Are Awarded $2Z9 Million in Implant Tria4 N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at A16; $5 Million for
Implant Leak, N.Y. TimES, Feb. 16, 1995, at A20; $6 Million Award in Implant Suit, N.Y. TiMEs
(National), Feb. 5, 1995, § 1, at 18. Professor Coffee suggests that the size of this settlement was also affected by the rules and procedures governing the settlement process.
Their key significance, he argues, was to reduce the opportunity for defendants' and plaintiffs' counsel to collude in a cheap settlement, which he views the asbestos global settlement to be (mistakenly, in my view). SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLuM. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995).
The fiscal viability of this settlement, and hence its continued existence, are far from
assured. The court recently found that the volume and amount of the existing and future
class claims will far exceed the $4.23 billion fund created by the settlement. Under a provision of the settlement authorizing a renegotiation of the amount and structure of the
settlement under these conditions, the parties and the court are seeking to come up with
additional funds for the present claimants, perhaps by reducing the funds payable to future claimants. The outcome of these negotiations will strongly affect the number of
claimants who decide to opt out of the settlement, which in turn will affect the defendants'
decisions about whether or not to terminate the settlement, as the settlement permits them
to do under certain circumstances. See Thomas M. Burton, Implant Fund Is Too Small to
CoverClaims, WALL ST.J., May, 2, 1995, at A3. Responding to these uncertainties and creating new ones, the major defendant in the case is seeking relief under Chapter 11 of the
bankruptcy law, which would stay all breast implant litigation against the company, barring
new claims and increasing pressure on the plaintiffs to accept a settlement. See BarnabyJ.
Feder, Dow Coming in Bankruptcy Over Lawsuits, N.Y. TImEs, May 16, 1995, at Al.
The Bendectin litigation constitutes another recent example of continuing plaintiff
successes-in this instance, at trial-despite very weak causal evidence, adverse rulings in
the appellate courts and exoneration of the product by other safety-conscious governments
including Britain and France. See Peter H. Schuck, Multi-CulturalismRedu. Science, Law,
andPolitics, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 7-10 (1993). For other examples, see PHANTOM Rss,
supra note 4, and Schuck, supra note 5.
7 Interview with Paul D. Rheingold, Esq., in New York, N.Y. (November 24, 1994)
[hereinafter Rheingold Interview]. Rheingold, a prominent member of the mass tort
plaintiffs' bar, represents breast implant litigation plaintiffs.
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Important questions naturally arise out of this redescription of
mass torts: If today's mass tort litigation truly differs from earlier versions, what factors produced these changes? Have these changes been
for the better? How does the current mass tort regime compare with
other possible approaches? The task of addressing these daunting
questions is exacerbated by the difficulties inherent in constructing an
empirical test of any answers that might be proposed: No sharp
generational line divides yesterday's mass tort litigation from today's,8
and both are still too recent to afford the scholar much perspective.
Accordingly, this Article offers only preliminary answers.
In developing these answers, this Article takes a view of mass torts
litigation that differs from the canonical view summarized above. I
call this view "institutional evolutionism." The evolutionist emphasis
draws attention to, and treats in a more consistent fashion, three distinct but related features of mass torts litigation: (1) incremental system-building, (2) common-law process, and (3) selection by judges
and other policymakers among competing institutional designs.
Before detailing the institutional evolutionist view, I wish to define the scope of my analysis. First, I offer it tentatively rather than
tendentiously. On a spectrum of persuasiveness, I believe that the institutional evolutionist view lies somewhere between plausible and
convincing; only more and better empirical research can determine
its exact location.
Second, the term "evolutionist" is meant only to be suggestive,
not rigorously scientific. I do not claim that biological metaphors furnish powerful explanations of complex legal phenomena. 9 I claim
only that these metaphors evoke gradual processes of conflict, change,
differentiation, complexity, and selection in nature which have rough
counterparts in the lives of legal systems and sub-systems. These natural processes may therefore have some modest heuristic value in illuminating the character of systems.
Third, while the institutional evolutionist view treats mass tort litigation more charitably than most previous accounts (including my
8 See generallyJudithResnik, From "Cases"to "Litigation,"54LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS. 5
(1991) (discussing changes in attitude and practice in mass torts from the 1960s to the
1990s). Even if such a line could be drawn, distinguishing parents from progeny is harder
in litigation than in life. Agent Orange, the Ur-case of mass tort class actions, was not
finally resolved until early 1994. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 1125 (1994). Asbestos litigation-which preceded the
Agent Orange class actions by nearly a decade-shows no signs of petering out, notwithstanding the pending settlement by some asbestos defendants of their future claims. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
9 On this question, see, for example, E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in
Jurisprudence,85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985) (tracing the idea of evolution in theories of
law); George L. Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Clark and Pamer,

90 YALE LJ. 1284 (1981) (discussing Professor Clark's theory of evolution).
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own earlier work),1° it by no means endorses the status quo. Mass tort
litigation continues to yield lower social benefits at a higher social cost
than it should. In the world of mass torts, therefore, a Dr. Pangloss is
unwelcome. The evolutionist perspective should encourage mass torts
scholars to debate the system's character not merely on the basis of
old facts and assessments but also in light of the improvements
wrought by incremental system-building, common-law process, and selection among competing institutional designs.
Finally, the institutional evolutionist perspective is primarily backward-looking; it seeks to expose the merits and demerits of our current system and to explicate the choices and defaults that have shaped
it; it does not support strong prescriptive claims. Nevertheless, this
analysis naturally leads to a consideration of alternative ways of handling mass personal injury claims." This consideration is the subject
of Part III.
This Article is organized into three parts that track the three distinct aspects of institutional evolutionism: Part I will address incremental system-building. Part II will discuss common-law process.
Finally, Part III will describe selection from among competing policy
approaches.
I
BUILDING A SYSTEM

Imagine that it is the summer of 1969. The term "mass tort" has
not yet been coined, although it has been loosely applied to airline
crashes, large fires, and other single-event accidents that happen to
affect numerous claimants. 12 Congress has not yet established a compensation program for coal miners suffering from black lung
(although it will do so before the year is out).13 Clarence Borel has
not yet filed his soon-to-be paradigmatic mass tort action against the
manufacturers of asbestos insulation materials. 14 With the blessing of
10 E.g., ScHucK, supranote 5; Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: DeferralRegistries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HAZv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1992).

11 One promising reform is the development of a market in mass tort claims. See
discussion infra part IH.B.
12 E.g., H.NR S. COHN & DAVID BOLLIER, THE GREAT HARTFORD CiRcus FIRE: C .ATriE SEFrLEMENT OF MASS DISAsTRs (1991). As Professor Robert Rabin has noted, empiri-

cal studies of aviation litigation demonstrate that more than "massness" is required to
produce the high transaction costs and other difficulties associated with the mass tort litigation problem. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy ofA Mass Toxics Adminis-

trative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REv. 951, 953-54 (1993). To underscore this
distinction, Professor David Rosenberg has referred to the newer phenomenon as mass
exposure litigation. See generally Rosenberg, supranote 2.
13 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83
Stat. 742, 792-98.

14 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974). There were precursors, such as the MER/29 litigation, which ante-
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the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), physicians routinely prescribe Diethylstilbestrol (DES) to prevent miscarriages.' 5 Agent Orange is widely deemed a miracle defoliant that will save the lives of
soldiers and civilians rather than putting them at risk of serious illness
or death. 16 The newly-designed Dalkon Shield is being heralded as a
safe, effective contraceptive. 17 Bendectin is still considered to be a
wonder drug by the FDA and by tens of millions of women suffering
from morning sickness.' 8 Silicone breast implants have been on the
market for only a few years; two decades will elapse before the FDA
begins to warn women about them. 19 Although the federal government has long engaged in nuclear testing, no one seriously believes
that it would knowingly expose soldiers or civilians to dangerous levels
of radiation.2 0 Repetitive-strain disorders and electro-magnetic field
syndromes are not even a gleam in the eye of the most resourceful
and creative plaintiffs' lawyers. 2 ' Cigarette manufacturers have won
the first wave of litigation against them by a "knockout," causing the
wave to retreat and discouraging further suits by smokers until the
1980s.22

Consider further the social and technological changes that will
affect the management of public health risks in the future. Industry
and government will develop thousands of new chemicals, processes,
and technologies. Scientific measurement technology will advance to
the point at which even an undergraduate chemistry student can determine human exposures to potential toxins at levels of a few parts
per trillion-levels far lower than those at which science could confidently determine actual toxicity. Public fear that these toxins cause
cancer and other diseases will intensify, influencing the agendas of
legislators, regulators, insurers, corporations, environmentalists, consumerists, the mass media, and other political interests. In response,
many new regulatory agencies will be created to tame and prevent the
dated but in important respects prefigured, the institutionalized multidistrict litigation that
is so common today. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successfd
Mass DisasterLitigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116 (1968).
15 See ROBERTAJ. APFEL & SUsAN M. FISHER, To Do No HARM: DES AND THE DILEMMAS
OF MODERN MEDICINE (1984); ROBERT MEYERS, DES: THE BrrrER PILL (1983).
16

See SCHUCKr, supra note 5, at 16-20.
See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAw: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 1 (1991).
18 See Schuck, supra note 6, at 1-10, and sources cited therein.
17

19
20
21
§ 3, at
22

See, e.g., Hensler & Peterson, supranote 1, at 992-98.
Cf. Nancy Hogan, Shielded from Liability, A.BAJ., May 1994, at 56.
See BanabyJ. Feder, A SpreadingPain,and CriesforJustice,N.Y. TMES, June 5, 1994,
1; Roy W. Krieger, On The Line, A.BA J., Jan. 1994, at 40.
KEETON Er a.., PRODUCrS IABIny AND SAFEY (2d ed. 1989), quoted in Gary T.
Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY. LAw, Pouncs, AND CULTURE
131 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). The first such case was Lowe v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9673(C) (E.D. Mo., filed Mar. 10, 1954).
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torrent of newly-revealed risks, but their capacity to regulate these
risks rationally and effectively will swiftly be overwhelmed. Political
and legal decisions will require convincing scientific evidence that
even the most sophisticated scientific techniques cannot provide and
23
that the legal system cannot readily process.
A.

The Emergence of a New Legal Regime

Tort litigation over occupational, environmental, and product
risks burgeoned after 1969-much of it displaying features sufficiently
distinctive and recurrent to constitute a discrete legal phenomenon
deserving of its own moniker-the "mass tort." This litigation raised
novel and complex legal, factual, and policy questions in such diverse
legal subdisciplines as civil procedure, choice of law, liability doctrine,
evidence, professional ethics, governmental immunity, insurance,
bankruptcy, risk assessment and regulation, and court administration.
The volume of mass tort litigation grew in response to the expansion and transformation of tort liability in favor of plaintiffs-particularly in the area of products liability, where strict liability became the
dominant rule.2 4 Courts recognized new categories of compensable
harms, including some merely incipient ones.2 5 The level of compensatory damage awards increased, largely but not exclusively due to the
rising cost of health care. Moreover, the possibility of punitive damages, seldom awarded in earlier products liability cases, became an
important factor in mass tort litigation.
At both the federal and state levels, dramatic procedural and institutional innovations reshaped mass tort litigation. Individual tort
actions led to the technique of bringing groups of similar cases, which
in turn encouraged more extensive use of multidistrict litigation and
case consolidations, certification of class actions, coordination (both
formal and informal) of state and federal litigation, and negotiation
of global settlements. Congress liberalized the Bankruptcy Code, 26
and many large corporations sought protection in Chapter 1127 from
expanded tort liabilities, among other claims. The personal injury bar
See Schuck, supra note 6.
Some commentators have observed a recent slowing or even reversal of this proplaintiff trend. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet
Revolution in ProductsLiability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 735 (1992);James A. Henderson,Jr. &
Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 480 (1990); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginningand the Possible
End of the Rise of Modem American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 603 (1992).
25
Important examples include compensation for the fear of future injury, for medical monitoring costs, and for non-impairing conditions such as pleural plaques due to
asbestos exposure. See Schuck, supra note 10, at 574.
26 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
27 In the asbestos field alone, fourteen companies had done so as ofJuly 1991. See
Schuck, supra note 10, at 555 n.56 (listing companies).
23
24
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itself underwent major changes, with the traditional slip-and-fall
claimant's lawyer giving way to a highly sophisticated plaintiffs' bar
supported by extensive information exchanges, collaborative techniques, and long-term financing. As the likelihood of having to satisfy
enormous judgments increased, liability insurance for many importarit environmental risks became unavailable, unaffordable, or subject
to broad coverage restrictions.
To anticipate these developments would have required a clairvoy28
ance seldom vouchsafed to politicians-or, indeed, to anyone else.
Having had little experience with mass exposure torts, legal policymakers probably assumed, like the rest of us, that the future would be
rather like the present, only more so. This assumption of continuity,
of course, proved to be stunningly false.
B.

The Evolution of a Mass Tort System

Once courts began to realize that they were confronting a new,
quite different phenomenon, 29 they entered a period of desperate improvisation that has only recently congealed into a system. Compared
with the law's traditionally glacial rate of change, some of these innovations in mass tort law occurred with lightning speed.30 Nevertheless,
courts have viewed most of these innovations-including some of the
most controversial ones-as incremental, not radical departures from
3
past practices. '
The core problem driving the evolution of mass tort litigation was
uncertainty. Uncertainty typically surrounds the procedural law governing such disputes: questions of choice of law, evidence (especially
evidence of general and specific causation), claims aggregation, and
the number and nature of present claimants and anticipated future
28

This is not to say, of course, that there were no foreshadowing or prophetic voices.

See, e.g., Samuel D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to
Injury Litigation,59 MICH. L REv. 259 (1960) (suggesting legal reforms to facilitate resolution of anticipated litigation involving nuclear energy torts); IrvingJ. Selikoff et al., Asbestos
Exposure and Neoplasia, 188 JAMA 22 (1964) (linking asbestos to lung cancer). A federal

program to compensate black lung victims would be enacted in the last days of 1969. See
infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
29 This dawning consciousness can be glimpsed in Judge Weinstein's assumption of
the Agent Orange litigation from Judge Pratt in 1983. See SCHUCK, supranote 5, at 111-42.
30 For example, Professor Coffee dates the appearance of certified settlement class
actions to 1989 (in the Dalkon Shield case), only six years ago. Coffee, supra note 6.
31 Perhaps the most controversial current example is the use of settlement class actions in "immature" tort cases such as the Ford Bronco H litigation discussed in Coffee,
supra note 6, and the certification of class actions for settlement that could not have been
certified for litigation, a practice that was recently rejected by a panel of the Third Circuit.
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 94-1064, 941194, 94-1195, 94-1198, 94-1202, 94-1203, 94-1207, 94-1208, 94-1219, 1995 WL 223209 (3d
Cir. Apr. 17, 1995) [hereinafter In re GMC]. For the distinction between mature and immature torts, see infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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claimants. Uncertainty also shrouds the applicable substantive law of
mass torts, whether it be negligence, strict products liability, or governmental liability. Finally, various factors influencing the relief will
be uncertain, in particular: the potential compensatory and punitive
damages; the availability and extent of insurance coverage; and in
some cases, the continuing economic viability of defendants. These
multiple uncertainties increase the cost of filing and litigating claims,
discourage meritorious claimants, threaten horizontal equity among
victims, enlarge the discretion of judge and jury alike, and raise the
32
deadweight costs of insurance.
Although these uncertainties were greatest in the early stages of
mass tort litigation, they diminished over time due to the gradual
"maturation" of the mass tort system through litigation and settlements, as well as the practical adaptations made by all participants in
the mass tort system. Francis McGovern introduced the "maturity"
concept into the mass tort lexicon in the late 1980s. 3 3 In his terms,

litigation matures after there has been full and complete discovery,
multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions. At the mature stage of mass tort litigation, little or no new evidence will be developed, significant appellate review of any novel legal
issues has been concluded, and at least one full cycle of trial strategies
has been exhausted.3 Only at this stage, McGovern contends, can a
large number of similar but discrete, high-cost disputes be consolidated into groups of similar cases to facilitate settlement en masse.
His leading example of mature mass tort litigation involves asbestos. In its early years, asbestos litigation was so fragmented, chaotic,
costly, and unpredictable that it resembled an unruly, erratic adoles36
cent.3 5 During that period, relatively few asbestos cases went to trial,
but those that did, coupled with the numerous settlements, created
patterns that the lawyers discerned and used. Asbestos litigation
crossed a kind of developmental threshold in the early 1990s; thereaf-

32 Uncertainty, of course, is the raison d'etreof insurance. But where the uncertainty
surrounding a risk exceeds the level that can be underwritten on a sound actuarial basis,

the excess constitutes a cost that the insurer bears at its peril. Howard Kunreuther et al.,
InsurerAmbiguity and Market Failure, 7J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71, 82-83 (1993).
33 Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659
(1989) (pointing to asbestos litigation and the Dalkon Shield litigation as examples). A
related idea is that of a "congregation" of cases that follows a "career." See Marc Galanter,
Case Congregationsand Their Careers, 24 LAw & Soc'y REv. 371, 39092 (1990) (citing asbestos
litigation as an example).
34 McGovern, supra note 33, at 659.
35 See generaly MAVFR H. BEmNSTErN, REGULATING BustuFSS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955) (describing a life cycle theory of administrative agencies); ERIK H. ERIKSON,
CHILDHOOD AND SOCIa-T (2d ed. 1963) (describing a life cycle theory of personal identity).
36 Galanter, supra note 33, at 390 n.30.
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ter cases could be resolved more readily in a more systematic, inex-

pensive, predictable-and therefore equitable-fashion.
Some disagree with McGovern's advocacy of a maturity criterion
as a judicial standard,3 7 but the dynamic that this criterion describes
seems undeniable. A course of litigation and a pattern of settlements
determines the legal consequences of individual torts; this greater de-

terminacy in turn makes it easier to exploit aggregative procedures to
refine and establish claim values.3 8 It is characteristic of mass torts
that their claim values tend to be highly interdependent,establishing the
value of claim A helps to determine the value of claim B.3 9 If claim
values can be established within a relatively narrow range of uncertainty, the wholesale settlement of cases can proceed.40
McGovern's analysis regarding the maturation of an individual
mass tort can be usefully extended to mass tort litigation more generally. The array of mass torts litigated during the last twenty-five years
reveals recurrent patterns of litigant behavior, judicial decisionmaking, and institutional change. Whether the tortious agent is asbestos,
DES, Agent Orange, breast implants, Dalkon Shield, repetitive stress
disorders, Bendectin, or heart valves, the claims are litigated and resolved in strikingly similar ways. Most of these ways are calculated to
reduce uncertainty.
The propensity of a maturing mass tort system to reduce uncertainty reflects more than an unfolding, cumulating litigation process;
it also reflects relentless efforts by litigants, lawyers, insurers, and
judges to manage both risk and compensation in order to achieve
transactional efficiency, horizontal equity, and greater predictability.
These efforts can be analyzed into five elements: (1) "lawyerizing"
mass tort risks; (2) improving loss- and risk-spreading arrangements;
(3) adopting new modes of judicial management; (4) making claim
values more predictable; and (5) negotiating global settlements. Together, these elements constitute an increasingly coherent legal regime that transcends the particularities of any single mass tort.
37 For a strong critique of McGovern in this regard, see David Rosenberg, Comment,
Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from A Special Master,69 B.U. L. Rsv.
695, 707-11 (1989). Rosenberg does not attack the notion that tort claims can mature over
time, but instead criticizes McGovern's argument that maturity should be a prerequisite to
the use of collective procedures.
38 The value of a claim equals its expected return, which is a function of the legal and
factual contingencies affecting the liability and damages issues, the time and costs needed
to liquidate the claim, the risk of defendants' insolvency, and so forth.
But even where the liability issues remain murky and outcomes are therefore difficult
to predict, the types of injury are relatively fixed; hence, ifliability is established future
damage awards can be more accurately predicted over time on the basis of damage awards
rendered in cases already litigated in the same jurisdiction involving similar injuries.
39 Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 967-68.
40
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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"Lawyeizing"Mass Tort Risks

Many regulatory agencies established during the 1960s and 1970s
were designed to mobilize technical expertise, identify significant
public health risks, and then act to reduce them.41 Such regulatory
schemes were intended to render private tort lawyers ancillary, if not
superfluous, to the regulators engaging in risk management. 42
Alas, as has frequently been the case in the history of the administrative state, this promise proved to be false, or at least vastly exaggerated. Environmental, occupational, and product risks are actually
identified through complex processes in which many actors, endowed
with different resources, responding to different incentives, and employing different methodologies, play a role. Often, these risks are
first revealed by research scientists, public health and environmental
organizations, specialized science and health journals, and other private groups. These risk monitors then communicate their research
findings to those who are in a position to act upon this informationmass media, industry-specific newsletters, labor unions, policymakers,
and services that publish and distribute this information to lawyers.
Sometimes, plaintiffs' lawyers are alerted to litigation-worthy conditions by an accumulation of workers compensation awards, consumer complaints, public health agency reports, or media coverage. 43
This information flow triggers a "lawyerization" of risk. Defense lawyers huddle with their corporate clients to decide how to respond to
this information." Meanwhile, plaintiffs' lawyers assess their options:
They conduct legal and factual research, contact scientific experts, estimate transaction costs, troll for potential clients, consult with col41 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the National
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)
are among the health and safety regulatory agencies established during the 1960s and
1970s. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was established in 1906 or so.
42 The precise role of the tort bar turned on whether the regulatory statute preempted or preserved private tort remedies. Cf Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992) (holding that certain tort claims were preempted by the federal cigarette
package labelling act).
43 Repetitive stress disorders and auto safety defects are examples. See Edward Felsenthai, An Epidemic or a Fad? The Debate Heats Up Over Repetitive Stress, WALL ST. J., July 14,

1994, at Al (over 3,000 lawsuits filed; over 1200 newspaper and magazine stories reported
in the last year). The causal influence of media reports and plaintiffs' lawyers activity, of
course, can be mutually reinforcing. With some consumer products, the media's mention
of a dangerous defect can cause reputation-minded manufacturers to act swiftly to remove
the product from the market. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1015-16 (citing
other examples).
44 See Philip J. Hilts, CigaretteMakers Debated the Risks They Denied, N.Y. TIMES,June 16,
1994, atAl. In some industries, product recalls are more feasible because detailed records
of purchases and identifiable end-users exist. See, e.g., Warren E. Leary, Remedy Sought for
22,000 Heart Patients With Risky Pacemakers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1995, at A9 (describing

voluntary recall).
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leagues about possible cost-sharing arrangements, and perhaps
generate additional media attention. At some point, plaintiffs' lawyers
may contact potential defendants to propose informal settlements,
and if the parties cannot come to terms, mass tort litigation may ensue. The plaintiffs' lawyers' powerful "investment engines" propel the
process forward toward the settlement conference and perhaps even
to the courthouse.4 5 Only seldom does formal regulatory agency action spawn mass tort litigation; in cases as diverse as asbestos, Dalkon
Shield, DES, Agent Orange, auto safety, and tobacco, the enforce46
ment agency took action only years later, if at all.

Despite the very large volume of mass tort claims, the number of
lawyers who undertake long-term commitments to represent mass tort
claimants and to litigate on their behalf is relatively small. Tort litigation has become remarkably specialized.4 7 The same elite group of
plaintiffs' lawyers turns up on the management committees of one
mass tort litigation after another. Much the same is true on the defendants' side. This "repeat player" phenomenon creates a high degree of informal coordination, continuity, and learning across
different mass torts. It also causes litigators to devote much effort to
building and maintaining their reputations and credibility. This fur48
ther facilitates the lawyerization of mass tort risks.
In sum, an intricate and increasingly efficient private system generates, processes, disseminates, coordinates, and deploys most of the
risk information that lawyers need to initiate mass tort litigation. Personal, organizational, and professional incentives fuel this system-a
blend of material gain, professional prestige, and ideology. Contrary
to the original regulation schemes fashioned in the 1960s and 1970s,
government agencies tend to play a subsidiary role in this system.
They may sponsor research that aids in risk identification and may
gather (or passively receive) evidence that can help personal injury
lawyers (and eventually regulators) establish that a significant public
45 The phrase was coined by Francis E. McGovern, Looking to the FutureofMass Torts: A
Comment on Schuck and Siliciano, 80 ComzRN.u L. Rsv. 1022, 1026 (1995).
46 For a discussion of some of the regulatory weaknesses that contributed to the rise

of mass torts litigation, especially in the area of medical devices, see Hensler & Peterson,
supra note 1, at 1017-18; see asoJERRY L. MAsI-Aw & DAvED L HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
Auro SAFE-y (1990) (documenting that the agency's standard-setting efforts were so sluggish that tort litigation and negotiated recalls became far more significant sources of pressure for enhanced auto safety).
47 See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
48 According to Professor Coffee, the diffusion of legal knowledge is rapid within the
interconnected defense bar, but not within the far more fragmented plaintiffs' tort bar.
Coffee, supra note 6. This claim is doubtful given the high degree of coordination and
specialization among mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers. See, e.g., Hensler & Peterson, supra note

1, at 1025-26; McGovern, supra note 45, at 1026; Glenn Collins, A Tobacco Cases Legal Buccaneers, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 6, 1995, at DI (reporting that a consortium of plaintiffs' lawyers

involving almost 60 law firms has amassed a war chest of almost $6 million).
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health risk exists.49 But it is the private plaintiffs' lawyers who usually
do most of the heavy lifting.
2.

Improved Loss- and Risk-SpreadingArrangements

Like so many other complex systems in advanced societies, mass
tort litigation depends on practices and institutions that distribute
risks and losses. The particular risks at issue here include the liability
of those who create dangerous conditions, the losses suffered by those
exposed to such conditions, and the risk of economic loss to private
lawyers whose profit-driven investments make the mass tort system
possible in the first place.
The current system of insurance for potential mass tort liabilities
evolved out of the unprecedented, apparently unanticipated environmental liability insurance crisis that crested in the 1980s. Writing in
1988, a leading academic analyst of insurance law summarized the
sources of this crisis:
The new environmental liability tests the limits of insurance in three
ways. First, it has created new forms of statutory liability against
which it is difficult to insure. Second, judicial strategies of interpretation have made it difficult for insurers to rely on the meaning of
insurance policy language designed to avoid covering uninsurable
risks. Third, the distinct threat of other, common-law expansions of
liability creating additional uninsurable risks that cannot be reliably
excluded by policy language
renders the scope of an insurer's fu50
ture obligations uncertain.
Similar developments contributed to analogous upheavals in the
products liability insurance market.5 '
Widespread concern about these conditions, heightened through
intensive lobbying by the affected industries, produced swift political
responses. Legislators in many states enacted tort reform measures
designed to increase the availability and reduce the cost of insurance
49
Indeed, the role of regulatory standards in the mass tort system is even more attenuated than this. Although defendants' non-compliance with a regulatory standard certainly strengthens plaintiffs' claims in court, the reverse is not necessarily true. Under
prevailing tort principles, defendants' compliance with such standards is not binding upon
the jury, which ordinarily is permitted to make its own assessment of the challenged conduct. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 283 (5th ed.
1984). Pending legislation would modify this rule, at least with respect to punitive damage
claims challenging products whose safety has been certified by the FDA. See H.R. 917,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(d) (1995) (the "Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act").
50
Kenneth S. Abraham, EnvironmentalLiability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.

L. REV. 942, 955 (1988).
51
See, e.g., PErTER HUBER, L Aw.IU

THE LEGAL REVOLUTiON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

(1989); George L Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisisand Modem Tort Law, 96 YAE L.J. 1521
(1987). But seeJon Hanson & Stephen Croley, What Liability Crisis? An AlternativeExplanation for Recent Events in Products Liability,
8 YmA.J. REG. 1 (1991).
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against environmental and product-related mass tort liabilities. 52 Congress moved, albeit haltingly,53 to improve the Superfund litigation
morass.- Courts stemmed and then reversed many of the earlierjudicial expansions of tort liability. 55 The insurance industry modified its
liability policies and marketing practices to eliminate unprofitable
lines, reduce moral hazard and uncertainty, and otherwise manage its
underwriting risks more effectively. 56 It also established administra-

tive mechanisms to negotiate and coordinate the resolution of its
enormous coverage disputes both within the industry itself and with
its corporate clients.57 Nevertheless, some of these coverage disputes
could only be resolved through satellite litigation which was very costly

58
and complex in its own right.
Many corporations also took steps to spread their mass tort liabil-

ity risks and losses through mechanisms other than conventional lia-

bility insurance.

In the asbestos litigation, for example, some

defendant corporations formed consortia to share expenses, reduce

transaction costs, and present a united negotiating front with the
plaintiffs' lawyers. 59 More commonly, companies such as JohnsManville Corp. (in the asbestos litigation) and A.H. Robins Co. (in the
Dalkon Shield litigation) filed for protection under the bankruptcy
laws, 60 which allowed them to redistribute their past losses and future
52
There is evidence that these efforts succeeded in achieving at least some of their
objectives. See, e.g., Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reforn Legislation:

Assessing Our Control ofBisks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTTION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 272 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).

53
54

INNOVATION, COMPETI-

See infra note 154.
See Cleanup Gets Little of Superfund Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, § 1, at 27.

55 KEETON Et" At-, supranote 22. The 104th Congress threatens to restrict tort liability
even more. See Peter H. Schuck, Tortured Logi NEw REPUBUC, Mar. 27, 1995, at 11-12.

56 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 51, at 1570-76 (describing liability insurers' movement to
claims-made policies, coverage exclusions, lower policy limits, larger deductibles and coinsurance, and "retro-date" provisions); Thorn Rosenthal, Esq., Remarks at Mass Torts Seminar, Yale Law School (Apr. 21, 1994).
57 See Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of A Public Problem, 33
CLEv. ST. L. REv. 375 (1984-85).
58 Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 45 U.S. 1109 (1981); UNR Inds., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 942 F.2d
1101 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1586 (1992).
59 The Center for Claims Resolution, a not-for-profit organization established by a
group of asbestos manufacturers to process asbestos-related claims, is an example. For a
description of the Center, see Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 264 (E.D.
Pa. 1994).
It must be noted, however, that such cooperation and coordination is atypical. Many
mass tort cases, such as Dalkon Shield and Albuterol cases, are brought only against a
single defendant. Even where there are multiple defendants, such as in the DES and
breast implant litigation, conflict and finger-pointing is far more common than cooperation. See Rheingold Interview, supra note 7.
60
For a discussion of these bankruptcies, see In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.,
1995 WL 21615 (E. & S.D.N.Y.Jan. 19, 1995) (Johns-Manville Corp.); SOBOL, supra note 17,
at 51-59 (A.H. Robins Co.).
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risks by reorganizing their capital structures and limiting their vulner-

ability to litigation.
These recent risk-spreading efforts have produced many of the
desired results. Mass tort liability is once again an insurable risk.61
Although new crises may well occur,62 the liability insurance market,
which is essential to the mass tort litigation and compensation systems,
appears to have matured into a more sustainable form.
More efficient risk-spreading and risk-reduction mechanisms for

workers and consumers exposed to mass tort risks have also been devised, although the effects of these mechanisms are more indirect and
therefore more difficult to measure, than those aimed at corporate

liability risks. On the deterrence side, federal and state ight-to-know
laws have increased the amount and quality of information available

to workers and consumers who are at risk of exposure to toxic substances. 63 Environmental and public health standards, most of which

have been adopted since the early 1970s, should in time reduce the
incidence and severity of long-latency harm such as asbestos-related
disease and of traumatic harm such as auto-related injury.64 Finally
Medicaid, Medicare, and disability programs have expanded rapidly
during the past decade, effecting a substantial redistribution of health

care costs which constitute a major component of mass tort
65

damages.
Plaintiffs' lawyers have also improved their risk-bearing capacity,
and hence their ability to act as both the gatekeepers to and the entre-

preneurs of mass tort litigation. 66 In recent years, the plaintiffs' mass
61
See, e.g., Greg Steinmetz, InsurersDiscoverPollution Can Bolster Bottom Line, WAL. ST.
J., August 19, 1992, at B4 (noting the growing availability and profitability of environmental liability insurance).
62 The liability insurance industry is notoriously cyclical, although the reasons for this
volatility remain controversial. See Scott E. Harrington, Liability Insurance: Volatility in Prices
and in the Avaiability of Coverage in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTERErs INNOVATION, COMPETION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 47 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
63
See, e.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1994).
64 See Schuck, supra note 10, at 549 n.37.
65 Medicare benefit payments increased between 1980 and 1991 from $36 to $119
billion. Medicaid benefit payments increased between 1980 and 1991 from $23 to $77
billion. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994, Tables No. 156, 162. Disability payments are more difficult to quantify as they include federal, state, workers' compensation,
and private programs, but they too have grown rapidly. Between 1980 and 1992, for example, Social Security disability benefit payments more than doubled to $31.1 billion. Id. at
Table No. 581.
66 The risk-bearing capacity of a plaintiffs' attorney depends on numerous factors,
including- the diversification of her litigation portfolio; access to reliable information
about the expected value of claims; access to financing; economies of scale in client development. claims processing and litigation; and opportunities to innovate and operate flexibly in these areas. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1042-43.
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torts bar has grown far more sophisticated, specialized, and efficient.
For example, some lawyers now concentrate on particular kinds of
torts, others on particular sites of bodily injury, and still others on
particular types of plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiffs' lawyers
have established clearinghouses that help coordinate the exchange of
legal briefs, depositions, information on expert witnesses, and other
types of costly litigation resources-cooperation that partly reflects
the interdependence of mass tort claims values noted earlier. 67 The
Trial Lawyers Association of America now distributes a flood of professional development materials and services. Imaginative plaintiffs' lawyers have devised new techniques for running their practices,
obtaining and communicating with clients, influencing the media, administering cases, conducting discovery, managing documents, selectingjuries, and financing their often protracted litigation. As a result,
they have achieved a level of parity with their corporate opponents
68
that was unimaginable as recently as twenty years ago.
3.

Adopting New Modes ofJudicialManagement

The movement of courts toward managerial judging, 69 spurred by
mass tort litigation, has entailed some of the most far-reaching innovations in judicial history.70 These innovations include novel claims aggregation techniques, statistically-derived outcomes, 7' administration
of discovery, damages assessments, 72 advanced courtroom technologies, 73 more systematic alternative dispute resolution efforts, 74 and co67
See Galanter, supra note 33, at 387 (describing information-sharing and coordination by lawyers).
68 This has produced what two commentators have recently called an "extreme risk
aversion" on the part of mass tort defendants as they seek to avoid trials. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1044. The authors go on to state that "defendants in mass tort litigation may not hold the same advantages over the plaintiff that they have in ordinary tort
litigation." Id. at 1045.
See Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as Case Manager The New Role in Guidinga
69
Casefrom Filingto Disposition, 69 CAL. L. RPv. 770 (1981);Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudging
96 HAov. L. Rxv. 376 (1982).
70 See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequencesof Modern CivilProcess,
1994 Wis. L. REv. 631 (providing a rich historical perspective on this development).
71
See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L Rxv. 561 (1993).
72 See, e.g., SOBOL, supra note 17, at 227-28 (describing use of this technique in the
Dalkon Shield litigation).
73 See Douglas Frantz, High-Tech Ohio CourtroomProvides Glimpse Of Future (andPreview
of the Simpson Trial), N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 19, 1994, at A23.
74 RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Escaping the Courthouse, Research Brief, Dec.
1994 (on file with author). Perhaps the recent Supreme Court decision in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995), which broadly construed the Federal Arbitration Act, making written arbitration agreements in interstate commerce enforceable,
will encourage arbitration of some mass tort disputes. SeeJethro K. Lieberman &James F.
Henry, Lessonsfrom the AlternativeDispute Resolution Movement 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424 (1986).
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ordinated federal-state court proceedings.7 5 Like the plaintiffs' and
defendants' lawyers, a relatively small number of judges (and their
special masters) have become repeat players, adept at routinizing the
extraordinary.7 6 These judges have even established professional organizations and informal consultations that actively facilitate learning
and coordination in mass tort cases.
These innovations have already generated an immense body of
commentary, both descriptive and prescriptive.7 7 Judicial inventiveness in adapting and reshaping the procedural and substantive law of
mass torts has led many scholars and some judges to question the legal
and ethical propriety of these changes, as well as their practical consequences.7 8 Much of this commentary centers on the use of class actions in mass tort litigation, an approach that has increasingly met
with judicial approval despite the contrary views of the original Rule
79
23 draftsmen and the skepticism of many contemporary observers.
Signs of judicial, scholarly, and professional acceptance of the use of
75
See Hensler & Peterson, supranote 1, at 1054-55 (citing William W Schwarzer et al.,
JudicialFederalism in Acion: Coordinationof Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1689 (1992)).
76 Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 964, 967.
77 In addition to the pieces included in this symposium, see WmrsrEr.N, supra note 1;
Symposium, Reinventing Civil Litigation: EvaluatingProposalsfor Change, 59 BRoox. L. RPnv.
655 (1993); Symposium, Modem American Tort Law, 26 GA. L Rv. 601 (1992); Symposium,
Modern Civil Procedure: Issues in Controversy, 54 L.Aw & Com-EMP. PROBS. 1 (1991).
78 For some examples of scholarly skepticism about these innovations, see ScHuCK,
supra note 5; Coffee, supra note 6; Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidationof Complex Litigation: A CriticalEvaluation of the AL! Proposal, 10J.L. & COM. 1 (1990); Richard L. Marcus,
They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Vria Rule 23, 80 Coauu.L L. REV. 858 (1995);
Resnik, supra note 69; Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissen 1989
U. ILL. L. REv. 69. For some skepticism on the part ofjudges, see In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (Agent
Orange1); and In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994). EvenJudge Weinstein, who initiated many of these innovations, has expressed some reservations. See WEmsraN, supra note 1.
79 In addition to settlement class actions, the federal courts have certified opt-out
classes in both mass disaster cases and mass toxic exposure cases. Regarding settlement
class actions, see, for example, Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1020-21 (5th Cir.
1992), rehk granted; 990 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993) (oil refinery explosion); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (after vacating mandatory class); Coburn v.
4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977), mandamus denied sub nom. Union Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. District Court, 588 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1978) (Beverly Hills Supper Club fire).
But see In re GMC, supranote 31 (de-certifying settlement class action). Regarding opt-out
classes, see, for example, Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)
(water contamination); In re Copley Pharm., Inc., "Albuterol" Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
Docket No. 1013 (D. Wyo. Oct. 28, 1994) (albuterol); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d
996, 1009 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986) (asbestos in schools);Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus. 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986) (asbestos); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984) (opt-out class for compensatory damages, mandatory class for punitive damages); Spitzfaden v. Dow Coming Corp., 619 So.2d
795 (La. 1993) (breast implants).
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class actions in mass tort litigation can also be seen in the current
proposals to revise Rule 23 which, by setting forth explicit authority to
certify mass tort class actions, are likely to make it easier for judges to
do so.80

However one evaluates these changes, the important point for
present purposes is that they constitute a firm, self-conscious judicial
commitment to the project of systematizing and refining mass tort litigation into a distinctive genre with its own rules and practices, a project that legislatures have not disturbed. 8 1
4.

Making Claim Values More Predictable

The importance of accurate valuation of mass tort claims cannot
be overestimated; without it, the system would quickly break down
under the pressure of unresolved claims. The number of individual
claims currently pending and reasonably anticipated in the future is in
some mass tort litigations so large that it is simply not practicable to
provide individual trials in the traditional fashion.8 2 Even if it were
practicable to try all disputes, it would be neither desirable nor necessary:8 3 As is well known, the cost and risks of going to trial induces
settlement or other dispositions short of trial in over ninety-five percent of all civil claims, mass tort or otherwise. 8 4 The certification of
mass tort class actions, moreover, practically ensures that the litigation
will be settled short of trial.8 5 Yet negotiated settlements are possible
For a recent rejection of class certification on grounds that may apply to mass torts
more broadly, see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., No. 94-3912, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
5504 (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995); see also infra note 92.
80 Proposed Amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 23, under consideration by the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1993 draft on file with author); Telephone Interview with Professor Edward Cooper, University of Michigan Law School (Mar.
10, 1995).
81
See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text. Indeed, Congress confirmed and
strengthened this judicial project in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101650, 104 Stat. 5090 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993), which
encouraged the federal courts to extend their case management innovations. Preliminary
evaluation of the Act's effects indicates considerable implementation activity. See RAND
Institute for Civil Justice, Evaluating the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Research Brief,
Mar. 1995 (on file with author). In general, other countries have not undertaken this
project. SeeJohn G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AMFR.J. COMP. L. 507, 519-29 (1994).
82 RAND Institute for CivilJustice, Research Brief, supra note 74.
83 See Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815, 827 (1992). But see
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement 98 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
84 Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1147, 1213 (1992).
85 Indeed, the strong pressure to settle that class certification exerts on defendants is
sometimes considered a vice of mass tort class actions. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Inc., No. 94-3912, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5504, at *6 (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995). At a recent
conference on class actions, none of the large group of knowledgeable participants could
think of a single nationwide products liability or property damage class action that had
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only if the parties' separate estimates of a claim's expected value (net
of transaction costs) converge. This convergence, in turn, will occur
86
only if the parties can accurately predict case values.
The mass tort system increasingly generates predictable claim values for particular torts. As noted earlier, this more mature tort system
is facilitated by the development of new valuation techniques.8 7 Of
course, even without any special mechanisms for facilitating the convergence of claims valuations, the maturing of particular mass torts
would advance the maturation of other mass torts, and of the system
as a whole. Individual cases proceeding through trial, verdict, and appeal in a variety ofjurisdictions gradually reveal the behavior of juries
and judges, clarify the applicable rules of law, and render the expected value of individual claims more predictable. More accurate
information about claim values in turn encourages pre-trial settlements, which further refines and improves the quality of that information, which facilitates still more settlements, and so on. In this way,
the litigator acquires an increasingly solid empirical foundation for
his estimates of claim values.
But lawyers, courts, and scholars have also developed techniques
for predicting claim values that are more sophisticated and systematic
then the trial-and-error model outlined above. Some of these techniques are retrospective; they predict future claim values on the basis
of a careful review of outcomes in past cases. One such approach employs regression analysis of claim profiles and other statistical methods
to model the precise relationship that various claim characteristics
bear to claim values in recent litigation and settlements. This approach enables lawyers to estimate more accurately the expected value
of pending and future claims.8 8 The claims-processing facilities established by mass tort defendants and insurers (as in the asbestos and
silicone gel breast implants litigation) and by courts administering settlement funds (as in the Agent Orange and Dalkon Shield litigation)
employ some variants of this approach.8 9
gone to trial. Samuel C. Pointer, Remarks at Research Conference on Class Actions, Institute ofJudicial Administration, New York University Law School (Apr. 22, 1995).
86 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking 3J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Priest & Klein, supranote 40. Inaccurate estimates could fortuitously converge, but this is hardly to be expected. On the other hand, there may be a
certain class of cases in which uncertainty is so great that it facilitates, rather than impedes,
settlements. SeeMarc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle': JudicialPromotionand Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of theJudge in
Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 337, 346 (1986).
87 See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
88 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 71; Robinson & Abraham, supra note 2.
89 See generally Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settlement of Mass
Torts, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1990).
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Prospective methods have also been developed. Courts sometimes stage non-binding "mini-trials," relying on the hypothetical verdict to induce settlements short of a full trial.9 0 Other courts identify
"representative" plaintiffs, who are thought to typify larger claimant
populations. The claims of these representatives then proceed to full
trials, and the outcomes establish patterns that can encourage settlements or (if settlement fails) damages assessments with respect to the
claims of the remaining claimants. 91 Another prospective method is
statistical or sampling adjudication. 92 Here, the court aggregates a
large population of cases, selects a random sample, adjudicates each
sample case, and then statistically combines the sample outcomes to
yield results for all cases in the population. In contrast to the "representative plaintiff' approach, in which each claimant retains the right
to go to trial on his individual claim, the sampling approach requires
each claimant in the larger population to accept an average award
rather than one that is tailored to the circumstances of his individual
claim.9 3
Furthermore, experience gained and techniques developed in
the context of a particular mass tort can be used by practitioners specializing in other mass torts, or applied to new species of mass tort as
they arise. Information about the value of a Dalkon Shield claim may
not be fully transferrable to, say, a breast implant claim, but the information may nevertheless have some utility to breast implant litigators
in their efforts to narrow their zones of uncertainty.
5. Negotiating Global Settlements
"Global" settlements of mass tort claims represent the culmination of the system's maturation. Only at the high levels of aggrega90 See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summay Jury Tria: An Effective Aid to Settlement, 77
JUDICATURE 6 (1993).
91 Bone, supra.note 71; Saks & Blanck, supra note 83.
92 Id.
93
Bone, supra note 71, at 564-65. A number of variations on this basic theme are
possible. Common to all of these techniques, however, is their suppression of a claim's
individual characteristics in the interests of systemic efficiency, a "rough justice" version of
horizontal equity, and collective (and perhaps even individual) accuracy. See generally Saks
& Blanck, supra note 83 (finding that aggregation can increase efficiency, accuracy, and
equity).
These alternative methods of claims aggregation raise the important question of
whether class action treatment of mass tort litigation is really necessary. For a number of
commentators, the answer is no. Thus, a panel of the Seventh Circuit recently suggested
that such methods reduce the need to resort to class actions in mass tort litigation. In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., No. 94-3912, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5504, at *13 (7th Cir. Mar.
16, 1995) ("a sample of trials makes more sense than entrusting the fate of an entire industry to a singlejury"). In much the same spirit, plaintiffs' lawyer Paul Rheingold argues that
asbestos litigation aside, mass torts can be litigated quite effectively without class actions
and the many spurious claims that they attract. Paul D. Rheingold, Remarks at Research
Conference on Class Actions, supra note 85.
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tion, coordination, risk distribution, and legal and factual
determinacy, which typify a highly mature system, can global settlements of the kind that have recently been fashioned in mass tort cases
become practicable. Even then, global settlements are intricate and
extremely difficult to negotiate, 94 and those settlements that are
reached are not truly global. 9 5
The elusiveness and incompleteness of these settlements, however, should not obscure an extremely important fact: A much higher
percentage of tort victims file claims and receive some payment under
these mass tort settlements than would sue and recover in tort.96 The
vice of this virtue, however-and it is a great vice indeed-is that mass
tort actions attract, and mass tort settlements encourage and pay, a
large number of claims that are insubstantial-or, in the words of one
experienced plaintiffs' lawyer, 'junk."97 Moreover, these junk claimants may obtain substantial recoveries under the global settlements.9 8
Still, the relatively high percentage of genuine victims who will recover
something under global settlements must be counted as a weighty
advantage.
94 For a discussion of some of the impediments, see Hensler & Peterson, supranote 1,
at 1050-52; text accompanying infra note 116.
95 For a variety of reasons, a global settlement will probably not resolve literally all
claims. In the Agent Orange litigation, for example, several hundred claimants opted out
of the class action and therefore could not participate in the class action settlement. It is
noteworthy, however, thatJudge Weinstein did his best to extend the benefits of the settlement to those claimants who opted out of the class. See ScHuc, supra note 5, at 226. In
the asbestos litigation, the now-pending class action settlement covers only future claims,
not present ones, and the number of claimants who will opt out remains to be seen. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In the silicone gel breast
implant litigation, the pending settlement covers both present and future claims against
the participatingdefendants, but does not cover claims against defendants who declined to
join the settlement. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P10000-S, Civil Action No. CV 94-P-11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *78-86 (N.D.
Ala. 1994). Again, many claimants will opt out, if only because the funds will probably be
insufficient to cover all claims. See Feder, supra note 6; $5 Million for Implant Leak, N.Y.
TmEs, Feb. 16, 1995, atA20; $6MillionAward in ImplantSuit N.Y. Tuss (National), Feb. 5,
1995, § 1, at 18. In the Dalkon Shield litigation, the plan of reorganization confirmed by
the bankruptcy court did not cover claims brought against the company's insurers. SOBOL,
supra note 17, at 209-24.
96 See, e.g., Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1019 (summarizing earlier RAND
study of filing behavior in tort system); PAUL C. WEILER Er AL., A MEASURE OF MAuRAarICE:
MEDICAL INJuR, MALPRACrc LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 73 (1993) (accord-

ing to a study of New York hospitals, one in 50 negligent injuries yields a malpractice
claim).
97 According to Rheingold, 90% of the claims are "junk." Rheingold Interview, supra
note 7; see also McGovern, supra note 45 at 1023-24.
98 Note that the lowest scheduled award under the breast implant settlement is
$140,000. This amount may be reduced, however, if the number and amount of the claims
is large enough to deplete the fund, which appears to be the case, supra note 6. See Schedule of Benefits, Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice 6 (Sept. 16, 1994) (on file with
author).
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Global settlements can also resolve a variety of complex administrative and policy issues. These agreements establish detailed ground
rules to govern the necessary long-term relationship between bitter
adversaries, under changing and unpredictable conditions. These
rules cover such diverse issues as exposure criteria, medical criteria,
claims administration, atypical or extraordinary claims, all aspects of
compensation, funding guarantees, opt-outs, case flows, notice, counsel fees, administrative cost, informal dispute resolution, limits on judicial review, and termination of the agreement. In the absence of
global settlements, these thorny issues would have to be resolved by
further litigation and by courts lacking good information and relevant
expertise.
Global settlements provide strong evidence that contemporary
mass tort litigation has evolved into a far more coherent and efficient
system than its predecessors. All global settlements tend to follow the
same general pattern. Imitation being the sincerest form of flattery,
this suggests that mass tort litigation has engendered a relatively successful mechanism of dispute resolution. Experiences of litigators,
courts, and claims facilities in negotiating and administering global
settlements are being accumulated and integrated into patterned, recurrent, and increasingly predictable forms. As a result, new settlements are likely to employ variations on now-familiar themes. 99
Precisely for this reason, the question of whether these global settlements are fair and reasonable within the meaning of Rule 23(e)
assumes crucial importance. In its present form, the Rule supplies
judges with no explicit evaluative criteria for making this determination.10 0 Courts that have considered this issue focus on the specific
terms of the settlement, comparing the treatment of claimants under
the settlement against the likely disposition of their claims at trial. In
almost all cases, the courts have found the settlements unambiguously
fair. 10 1 These judicial affirmations, however, have not satisfied all
doubters; the skeptics tend to focus on the specific terms of particular
settlements, the potential for collusion between class counsel and defendants, and the risk of unwarranted preclusion of future claims. 10 2
99 But cf. Coffee, supranote 6 (criticizing the use of this model in some recent settlement class actions).
100 See William W Schwarzer, Settement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 837 (1995).
101 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (per Reed,
J.); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. iUab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, Civil Action
No. CV 94-P-11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *72 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (per
Pointer, J.). But see In re GMC, supra note 31 (decertifying settlement class action and
rejecting trial court findings that settlement was fair).
102 See Coffee, supra note 6; Susan P. Koniak, FeastingWhile the Widow Weeps: Georgine
v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1995). John Frank worries that
courts in these settlements cannot effectively ensure that class counsel "sell resjudicata for
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In this Article, I do not assess the fairness of any particular settlement; that task falls to those who have reviewed in detail all of the
relevant evidence bearing on this issue. Instead, I suggest two structural criteria that can help frame and inform any fairness analysis: (1)
the maturity of the tort, and (2) the conditions of claimant choice
among the competing compensation systems-the tort system and settlement-particularly the quality of information about claim values.
C. Assessing the Fairness of Global Settlements in Mass Tort
Actions
1. Maturity of Claims
The fairness of a mass tort settlement is much easier to assess
when a large volume and wide variety of claims have been litigated,
adjudicated, and settled by numerous lawyers, judges, and juries. In
contrast to an embryonic tort, a mature tort has generated a supply of
data which, applying the methods described above, can be used to
produce unbiased estimates of claim values. The judge in a mass tort
action can use these estimates to compare the value that a claim would
have if litigated through the tort system to its prospective value under
the settlement (applying appropriate discounts to reflect differences
in speed and certainty of recovery, the amount of legal fees, the level
of other transaction costs, and so forth). Furthermore, this data assists
the judge to make the irreducibly subjective judgments about how to
balance the values that each of the competing systems embodies and
that a fairness determination requires. Other things being equal, the
more mature the tort, the more confident the judge can be that all of
the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23 have been met,
that the negotiations were conducted at arm's length and free of actual or potential conflicts of interest, and that the actual settlement
terms negotiated by the lawyers are fair.
2.

Claimants' Choice Between the Tort System and the Settlement

In some cases, mass tort claims may be maintained as a class action only if the court certifies a mandatory class.' 03 Ordinarily, however, fairness will require that claimants be permitted to protect their
individual interests by making a meaningful choice either to remain
in the class or to opt out and proceed individually in the tort system.
Indeed, all recent global settlements have provided claimants with at
least two opt-out opportunities. For example, the Georgine settlement
that resolves future asbestos-related claims first permits a claimant to
an adequate price." John Frank, Remarks at Research Conference on Class Actions, supra
note 85.
103
SeeFED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1), (c)(3).
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opt out after the class notice is. published, and then (under certain
conditions) renews the opportunity after the claims facility has made a
specific settlement offer. 1°4 The silicone gel breast implant settlement, which provides a more determinate schedule of awards at the
outset, also provides multiple opt-out opportunities. 105 Current claimants may opt out either at the front end, or subsequently in the event
that the settlement fund becomes inadequate to cover all claims (a
"ratchet-down" opt-out). Ongoing and future claimants may likewise
opt out if and when their benefits are ratcheted down. 106 Defendants
in these settlements also insist on multiple opt-out rights, which usu10 7
ally depend on the number of claimants who decide to opt out.

The addition of intermediate and back-end opt-out opportunities
constitutes a highly desirable and important innovation for the emergent mass tort system despite the increased uncertainty that these opportunities create in the short term. Indeed, the fairness of a
settlement under Rule 23(e) may require that such opportunities be
extended to claimants. First, they institutionalize and enlarge the central value of claimant autonomy. Second, they permit a dynamic and
superior balance to be struck between the competing interests in aggregating and individualizing claims. Each claimant can then choose,
from among the alternatives the settlement makes available, the particular mix of collective and individual claiming that best serves her
wishes. Third, opt-out provisions furnish a kind of market test of a
settlement's fairness and adequacy, particularly of the specific compensation offers that will be made under settlement. 0 8
Suppose that a large number of claimants, counseled by their lawyers, conclude that the settlement offers they have received are too
low relative to the tort system baseline and therefore decide to opt
out. 10 9 Assuming that these claimants were well-informed, their decisions would constitute the best available (but not necessarily the only)
evidence of the settlement's overall inadequacy relative to that baseline. By the same token, of course, if relatively few claimants decided
104
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Access to
the back-end opt out is subject to some important restrictions. See id. at 281. This is discussed just below.
105
In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, Civil Action No. CV 94-P-11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *22 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).

106 Id. In addition, the settlement provides an opt-out right for the children of class
members and two opt-out rights (including a "ratchet down" provision) for foreign claimants. See Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice, supra note 85, §§ 18, 20, 22-24 (on
file with author).
107 See discussion supranote 6.
108 The market-testjustification for back-end opt outs was suggested to me by Professor
David Rosenberg in a personal conversation sometime in 1993.
109 If the number of opt-outs turns out to be large enough, the defendants may have a
right under the settlement agreement to terminate it.
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to opt out, their decisions would constitute equally strong evidence of
the settlement's overall fairness and adequacy relative to the baseline.
The number of opt-outs needed to discredit the fairness of a settlement presents a genuinely difficult question.1 10 Moreover, adverse se-

lection within the opt-out process may also occur; claimants with the
strongest claims may elect to opt out while those with weaker claims
may decide to remain in the class and get paid under the settlement."' This may cause the settlement to unravel as defendants find
themselves increasingly disadvantaged by it and thus decide to opt out
themselves, as they may have reserved a right to do under the settlement agreement. Fortunately, however, the system need not concern
itself overmuch with these uncertainties. Assuming that the notice
and information were adequate, the parties, counseled by their lawa2
yers, can resolve these issues for themselves."
Because opt-out provisions contribute to fairness and meaningful
choice only if claimants are sufficiently well-informed at the time they
must decide whether or not to join the class, front-end opt-out provisions, standing alone, may not be enough to warrant a judicial determination that a settlement is fair. Rather, the sufficiency of a frontend opt-out should depend in large part on the maturity or immaturity of the mass tort in question. In all opt-out class actions, Rule 23
requires that claimants receive at the front end adequate notice of the
implications of joining the class or not. In cases in which the tort is
immature, however, little discovery, adjudication, and settlement of
similar claims will have occurred; consequently, little useful information about claim values and other factors, such as the quality of class
counsel and potential conflicts within the class, may be available to
claimants at the front end. Indeed, the claimant in this situation is
trapped in a kind of Catch-22: In order to inform his decision about
whether or not to remain in the class, he must remain in the class and
see how the information that will subsequently be produced in discovery appears to affect the value of his claim. Should discovery reveal
that the claimant's best strategy would have been to proceed alone,
however, it will be too late for him to do so if the only opportunity to
opt out came at the front end."13
110 Indeed, just counting the number of genuine opt-outs can be a controversial matter, as evidenced by the pending dispute over this question in the Georgine litigation. See
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. CIV. A. 93-0215, 1994 WL 590611 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,
1994) (presenting findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of issuance of preliminary injunction).
11
For an explanation of adverse selection in the insurance context, see kENNETH
ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIA S 3-4 (1990).
112 Under Rule 23(e), of course, the court must make a threshold determination

of
fairness, but this precedes the opt-out decisions by parties to the settlement.
113 This Catch-22 merely reflects the more general fact that information is both costly
to acquire and. difficult to value until it is in fact acquired. The dilemma is therefore not
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The informational void can be even more prejudicial to uninformed claimants in three increasingly common situations. First, an
immature tort may produce a "settlement class action," in which the
action is simultaneously filed and settled. (This is to be distinguished
from a settlement in a conventional class action.) Here, the claimants' information about claim values may be inadequate even at the
back end (which Rule 23 does not expressly address), for there will be
little or no tort system experience against which claimants can compare their specific settlement offers.
Second, the class may contain future claimants who have been
exposed but are not yet injured (as with many asbestos claimants) or
have not yet been exposed but may be exposed in the future (as with
recipients of heart valves and breast implants that have not yet
malfunctioned). Here, claimants may not even know that they have a
claim, let alone its value, until after a settlement is concluded.
As many commentators have noted, future claims class actions raise
many vexing problems of effective notice, adequate representation,
litigation management, actual or potential conflicts of interest, legal
ethics, and claims administration." 4 I discuss future claims further in
Part III.
Third, the information about the number of present and future
claims, the value of those claims, and the rate at which they will be
filed may be so limited that even those settlements that are reached
and approved by the court may ultimately unravel, as may turn out to
be the case with the breast implant litigation." 5 This situation may
well leave claimants worse off, as a great deal of time will have elapsed
without progress toward the resolution of their claims.
A very different situation arises, however, when a mature tort
leads to a settlement. The asbestos litigation that culminated in Georgine is perhaps the best example. Here, a properly advised asbestos
claimant can draw on a twenty-five-year history of jury awards and settlements in a wide variety of litigation contexts before deciding at the
front end whether or not to remain in the class and, if so, whether to
accept a particular settlement offer at the back end. Moreover, as
noted above, the judge will be able to draw on this experience in determining whether to certify a class and whether to approve a settlement under Rule 23.116
unique to mass tort class actions; every uninformed plaintiff must invest in discovery ex ante
in order to learn expostwhether the investment was worthwhile. Indeed, plaintiffs in other
contexts face an even worse predicament insofar as they lack the option that a class member enjoys to free ride on discovery by the attorneys for the class.
114 See Hensler & Peterson, supranote 1, at 1045-48; Coffee, supra note 6.
115 See discussion supra note 6.
116 See supra part I.C.1 and 2.
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Accordingly, judges confronted with a Rule 23 fairness determination should require that the settlement contain a back-end opt-out
right whenever claimants cannot reasonably predict at the front
end" 7 the specific settlement offers that they will eventually receive at
the back end. This condition will usually exist in a settlement or a
settlement class action involving an immature tort and will arise in any
future claims class action, whether brought before or at the time of
settlement.
Assessing the fairness of the particular conditions that a settlement may place on the claimant's exercise of a back-end opt-out right
presents further difficulties." 8 From the claimants' perspective, some
conditions may clearly be objectionable. Certain conditions may prevent some claimants from exercising the back-end opt-out right immediately or perhaps at all; other claimants may find their rights
truncated under the settlement if they choose to return to the tort
system. The Ceorginesettlement, for example, places an annual cap on
the number of claimants with qualifying asbestos-related medical
claims who can return to the tort system or elect binding arbitration,
and it bars those who decide to proceed in the tort system from seeking either punitive damages or damages for mere exposure without
impairment." 9 In addition, claimants may not know whether these
conditions will actually affect them until well after the settlement is in
effect, when it will be too late to object. Yet, a settlement may be unattainable unless defendants can impose such conditions on back-end
opt outs and can also reserve their own opt-out right under certain
circumstances. Defendants' need for certainty about their future obligations and cash flows may impel them to reject any settlement that
fails to protect these interests.
It is doubtful that courts can deduce general principles to guide
them in reviewing the fairness of the conditions placed on back-end
opt-out rights. The probable consequences, and hence the fairness of
each condition, are likely to be tailored to each settlement-and as
always, both God and the Devil are in the details. The settlement
terms may subject defendants, and notjust claimants, to disadvantages
if a claimant decides to return to the tort system. Under the Georgine
settlement, for example, defendants may not raise noncausal defenses
117
In a settlement class action, for example, "front end" will usually refer to the time
that the settlement is approved.
118 Note that not all settlements condition back-end opt outs. Pfizer did not insist on
limiting them in the Shiley heart valve settlement, which involved a much smaller number
of claims. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 988-92.
119 See Stipulation of Settlement, Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D.
Pa. filed Jan. 15, 1993, amended Sept. 24, 1993) (part X.A, pertaining to case flow; part
X.G, pertaining to procedural rules), approved sub nom. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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in such a case. 120 These back-end opt-out provisions will embody a
variety of tradeoffs, the consequences and fairness of which must be
weighed and balanced.
My emphasis here in opt-out rights as indicia of a settlement's
fairness should not obscure the larger context in which fairness must
be assessed. An opt-out right, of course, is only one element of a complex settlement in which numerous other elements also implicate fairness concerns. It is the settlement as a whole that must be fair, not
any particular provision. Finally, the judge must also consider the risk
that an entire settlement otherwise conforming to the Rule 23 fairness
standard might collapse if she rejects a carefully negotiated opt-out
provision-perhaps throwing the parties back into the tort system
from which they hoped, perhaps with good reason, to escape.
II
COMMON-LAW PROCESS

The changes to the mass tort system described in the preceding
Part were fashioned largely through a process of common-law decisionmaking.12 ' Common-law adjudication is a distinctive lawmaking
process, with powerful normative claims grounded in the common
law's faithful reification of certain ideals, forms, and symbols cherished by American legal-political culture. In this Part, I argue that
understanding the common-law character of the mass tort system's development is at least as important to evaluating its performance as is
1 22
understanding the system's procedural and substantive content.
Before exploring the consequences of the common-law development of mass tort litigation, three categories of statutory intervention
into the mass torts area should be mentioned. First, Congress and
some state legislatures have enacted occupational and environmental
regulation measures, right-to-know statutes, special statutes of limitations, and other laws designed to prevent mass toxic harms and facilitate victims' recoveries. Second, Congress has established
administrative compensation programs directed at certain mass toxic
120

Id. at part X.C.3.

121 The common law of mass torts has borrowed extensively from equity jurisprudence,
which empowers courts to exercise broad discretion in tailoring old doctrines, procedures,
and remedies for application to the new, perplexing problems posed by mass torts. See
WEINSTEIN, supranote 1, at 123-62; Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of
Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL L. Rav. 269. When I refer to the "common law" of
mass torts, then, I simply refer to that body of applicable legal doctrines and procedures
initiated and then elaborated by the courts largely through incremental (some would say
ad hoc), case-by-case adjudication without the guidance of any comprehensive framework
or vision.
122 Again, the distinctiveness of this American approach should be noted. Fleming,
supranote 81.
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injuries, most notably the black lung benefits program. 23 The cost
and performance of the black lung program, however, have received
harsh and sustained criticism from many quarters. Indeed, for critics
of the mass tort system who advocate federal compensation statutes as
a solution, the black lung program's record has become the ultimate
conversation-stopper. 24 Third, as we have already seen, many states
adopted "tort reform" statutes in the 1980s,125 and although most

were targeted primarily at medical malpractice litigation, some of the
statutes inevitably affected mass tort cases as well.' 26 Still, no jurisdiction has even come close to establishing a comprehensive statutory
regime to govern the litigation or compensation of mass tort claims.
Like the discovery by the Moli6re character that he had been
speaking prose all his life, the fact that virtually all mass tort law is
judge-made seems embarrassingly obvious-once attention is called to
it. Even so, it is a striking fact, one that cries out for explanation. The
public and private interests involved in mass tort litigation are enormous. Moreover, almost all commentators view the current litigation
approach as a costly, tragic, social policy failure. Why, then, have politicians allowed judges to fashion this high visibility, high stakes legal
regime without any meaningful political direction, let alone a comprehensive statutory or regulatory framework? 27 To put the question another way: If in 1969 (the very year that Congress enacted the black
1

123 See supranote 13. Two more recent examples are the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Supp. V 1993), and the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Like the neonatal
injury reform schemes adopted in Virginia and Florida, these two statutes are narrowly
focused. According to a recent report, however, the vaccine program has paid almost $500
million in compensation. New Whooping Cough Vaccine Is Said to Eliminate Side Effects, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at A20.
I do not discuss state workers compensation statutes in this context because they were
designed primarily to address traumatic workplace accidents, not chronic occupational
diseases.
124 The black lung program's arbitrary, unscientific use of presumptions vastly increased the compensation paid. This approach was "the epitome of political manipulation
of the pork barrel process under the guise of operating a workers' compensation scheme,"
according to the most exhaustive study of the program to date. PETER BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG 128 (1987). Kenneth Feinberg, perhaps the leading expert on the
politics and administration of mass tort compensation programs, notes that Congress has
taken one lesson away from its experience with the black lung program: "Don't do it
again." Telephone interview with Kenneth Feinberg, Esq., cited in Edward B. Zukoski, The
Evolution of the Black Lung Compensation Program and Its Consequences for Mass Torts,
at 86 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
125 See supranote 52 and accompanying text.
126 Examples include changes in rules governing punitive damages, collateral sources,
and joint-and-several liability. Congress is almost certain to enact national caps on punitive
damage awards in product liability cases, which includes most mass torts. SeeNeil A. Lewis,
Senate Agrees On Bill to Cut Civil-CourtDamage Awards, N.Y. TMES, May 10, 1995, at Al.
127 If enacted, certain provisions in the tort reform sections of the civil liability legislation now pending in Congress would affect the mass tort litigation. In addition to the
punitive damages cap referred to in note 126, these provisions include the FDA safe harbor
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lung program) we had foreseen the development of a mass torts crisis
that defied resolution by even the most imaginative and resourceful
courts, would we have also predicted that no comprehensive remedial
legislation would have even been considered during the next twentyfive years?
A.

Possible Causes of Legislative Inaction

In seeking to account for this legislative inaction, we can quickly
dispose of two relatively straightforward explanations. The first possible explanation is that cautious politicians simply refuse to confront
so controversial an issue as mass torts policy, involving as it does powerful political interests, enormous sums of money, serious human suffering, conflicting values, and so forth, especially after the black lung
program fiasco. 128 But this ignores the fact that, like it or not, politicians simply cannot avoid addressing controversial issues indefinitely:
Given sufficient public outcry, they must respond one way or another.
Mass tort law, moreover, evokes far less controversy and political division than such explosive issues as abortion, taxation, affirmative action, gun control, and health care reform-issues on which legislators
routinely must take public positions, even at their political peril. Finally, this argument fails to recognize the eagerness with which many
politicians position themselves on some of the most controversial issues, including those just mentioned and indeed on tort reform itself.
A second explanation-that legislative inaction bespeaks satisfaction
with the mass tort system-seems clearly false. Virtually all politicians
(and judges) who comment on the mass torts system perceive a crisis
and assert that there are better ways to handle mass tort claims; these
critics typically suggest that an administrative compensation scheme
129
would be better.
Public choice theory suggests a somewhat more plausible explanation. 3 0 Perhaps legislators cannot, or do not wish to, assemble a
successful coalition in favor of any statutory change. Several factors
might support legislative inaction. First, expanding mass tort liability
may be highly advantageous to a forum state's citizens (and politicians
and judges) in that the plaintiffs tend to be state residents while the
defendants tend to be foreign corporations; hence, the benefits of
broad liability will inure to the forum state while the costs will largely
provision discussed supra note 49, and a provision concerning the standard for admitting
scientific evidence.
128 In an earlier article, I subscribed to this theory-too readily, I now think. See
Schuck, supra note 10, at 552.
129 For a summary and critique of these views, see Siliciano, supra note 2.
130
See DANIEL A. FARBE & PHILIP P. FPiucKE, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Edward
Rubin, Public Choice in Practiceand Theory, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1657 (1993) (reviewing FARBER &
FascKEY, supra).
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be borne by out-of-staters.13 ' Second, powerful interest groups may
prefer the status quo. This would be true, for example, if the beneficiaries of the current system were highly organized, with few conflict1 32 These
ing interests and large per capita stakes in the outcome.
conditions might, in fact, seem to hold, because plaintiffs' natural allies-the plaintiffs' bar, some "public interest" groups, and many labor unions13 3 -which ardently oppose any systemic change in mass
tort law,13 4 are highly effective lobbyists and shapers of public opinion. Potential mass tort claimants, on the other hand, are difficult to
organize politically because they may be unaware that they have been
exposed or that they may have valuable tort claims now or in the future. Even claimants with existing claims will experience such difficulties because they constitute a large and diverse group. Their
conflicting interests (they differ, for example, in the nature of their
exposures, in the strength of their claims, and the quality of their lawyers), and their incentives to free ride on others' organizational efforts would also impede their ability to form a broad reform
coalition.' 3 5
It is true, of course, that mass tort defendants and their insurers
strongly advocate some changes. Indeed, they have succeeded in securing state-level tort reform legislation reducing their liability
risks,1 3 6 and although they have failed for almost two decades to win
37
broad protection at the federal level, they might finally succeed.'
Not all mass tort defendants, however, support the same changes.

131 For a refreshingly candid defense of this strategy by a state judge, see RicHARD
NEELY, THE PRODUCT LABiLIm MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE PoLIIcs
OF STATE COURTS 1-4 (1988). In such a situation, defendants may seek and obtain a federal
statutory solution, a dynamic that contributed to the enactment of the Clean Air Act of
1970. See Bruce Ackerman et al., Toward a Theory of StatutoryEvolution: The Federalizationof
Environmental Law, 1 J. L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 813 (1985). It also helps to explain
industry's current efforts to federalize products liability law. See, e.g., Schuck, supranote 55.
132
See generay MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF CoLEcrvE ACTION (1965).
133 As Judge Reed noted in his fairness opinion, however, the AFL-CIO supported the
settlement plan in Georgine. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 325
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
134
The word "systemic" is meant to recognize that the plaintiffs' bar has supported
some statutory modifications of the common law, such as extensions of the limitations
period to revive barred mass tort claims. It also strongly supports modifying the common
law to make it easier for smokers (and states paying for smoking-related costs) to prevail in
court. See Richard Daynard, Smoking Out the Enemy: New Developments in Tobacco Litigation,
TRiAL. MAC., Nov. 1993, at 16. In general, however, the plaintiffs' bar has viewed most
statutory reform proposals as a threat to its interests (and those of its clients).
135
See OLSON, supra note 132.
136
137

126-27.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
The 104th Congress seems likely to enact at least some changes. See supranotes 49,
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Some, like the powerful tobacco industry, have found the commonlaw status quo quite congenial.' 3 8
A convincing public choice analysis would, of course, require a
more refined distinction among and consideration of particular
group interests.1 3 9 Moreover, such an analysis would also have to consider the role of groups such as judges' 40 and investors and the political force of ideology as well as that of economic interests. 14 ' But
enough has already been said to suggest that public choice analysis is
complex and points in a number of different directions; it yields no
unambiguous explanation of why politicians have allowed the judiciary to initiate, develop, and refine its own mass torts jurisprudence
despite widespread public and professional condemnation of the
results.
Finally, a legal process or "public interest" explanation is also
worth considering. 142 Perhaps legislators have left mass tort lawmaking to the courts because they believe that, all things considered, the
courts can do it better. Although many politicians perceive a mass
tort "crisis," they might nevertheless conclude that the scientific, legal,
economic, political, and social conditions relevant to mass injuries are
too complex and fluid to permit an adequate legislative response-a
conclusion that the experience with the federal black lung program
might well support 43 In this view, legislators might leave resolution
138
See Schwartz, supranote 22. This could change, however, if plaintiffs can substantiate claims left open by Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (e.g., fraud),
or if new groups of plaintiffs less subject to defenses, such as infants, bring suit against the
tobacco companies. See also Charles C. Correll, Jr., The Tobacco Industry's Liability for
Prenatal and Infant Injuries (October 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). Indeed, several states have already done so. See, e.g., Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Companies Are Set Back By Actions in Florida,Mississippi, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1995, at B4. The
recent certification of a class action against the companies may also weaken the defendants' commitment to the status quo. See Glenn Collins, Judge Opens Way for Class Action
Against Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at 1 (Castanolitigation in federal district court in
Louisiana).
139
Most product manufacturers, for example, presumably favor retaining some common-law products liability as a means of fostering consumer confidence in their products
which might be reduced if consumers could rely only on contract law and reputation to
enforce desired safety levels. The same is probably true of products liability insurers that
sell such coverage.
140
Some commentators suggest that the judicial commitment to settlement class actions and other controversial changes in the mass tort system reflects their obsession with
reducing their burgeoning caseloads rather than more disinterested motives. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 6; Marcus, supra note 78.
141 Public choice theory has difficulty taking account of non-economic values. See
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE
OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994). The role of ideology in the mass tort system
is briefly discussed infra part I.
142
E.g., MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1986);
Michael Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interes 44 LAw &

CorNmsP.PRoBs. 179 (1981).
143

See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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of systemic problems to the courts, the plaintiffs' bar, and corporate
defendants, with the expectation that these powerful, well-informed,
roughly balanced interests will develop workable solutions on their
own as needed-always subject, of course, to the possibility of legislative fine-tuning. As we shall see in the next subpart there are often
good reasons for legislators to pursue this strategy-at least to a
point-in the area of mass torts.
B.

The Pros and Cons of Common Law Policy-Making

Whatever the reasons for legislative inaction during the first
twenty-five years of mass tort litigation, the system remains almost entirely a regime governed by common law, developing and implementing policy in the common law's distinctive modalities.144 Common-law
policymaking, however, can be problematic for several reasons. 145
1.

Technocratic and Instrumental Considerations

First, if political accountability for policymaking is desirable, adjudication may represent a poor vehicle for accomplishing it. The judiciary, which dominates the process, is relatively insulated from the
kind of refined public opinion to which legislators and agency policymakers are subject. Moreover, the narrow focus of adjudication tends
to diminish the likelihood of political mobilization in response to imprudent or unjust policy decisions. The character and outcome of
adjudication is also influenced to a considerable extent by lawyers,
who are institutionally and ethically responsible to their clients, not to
the general public.
Second, adjudication constitutes a radically decentralized, poorly
informed decisionmaking process, which reduces the policy coherence and general applicability ofjudge-made law. Because tort adjudication tends to be very fact-specific, stare decisis and appellate review
are particularly weak coordinating mechanisms in the tort context.' 46
144
Indeed, in the traditional view, tort law should not be seen as a policy instrument at
all, but rather as an instrument of private law understood as correctivejustice. See Richard
A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Emestj. Weinrib, Corrective Justice; 77 IowA L. R-v. 403 (1992). Yet, even if one generally views tort law in general
as private law, it does not necessarily follow may not follow that one should also view mass
tort law in the same way. See Rosenberg, supra note 2. Certainly, the courts have treated
mass tort law as a public law problem, even while speaking the language of corrective
justice. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, The Asbestos LitigationCisis: Is ThereA Needfor an AdministrativeAlternative?, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 1819 (1992).
145 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The NewJudicialIdeology of Tort Law, in NEw DIRMcoNs IN
LLA~mrir LAw 4 (W. Olson ed., 1988) (discussing the policymaking weaknesses of commonlaw judges); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973) (discussing the difficulties of polycentric decisionmaking in ajudicial setting).
146 See Yeazell, supra note 70, for a discussion of the limits of appellate review. This
point applies a fortiori to mass tort litigation, where the trial judge's managerial impera-
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Furthermore, rules of evidence limit the kind of policy-relevant information to which judges have access. Adjudication also has a selection
bias against the most typical, generalizable behavioral patterns with
which policymakers should be primarily concerned.
Third, the institutional competence of the judiciary limits the
range of issues that it can address effectively. Common-lawjudges are
generalists, seeing relatively few cases dealing with any given subject
and having little control over their issue agendas. In seeking to influence behavior and implement their decisions, common-law judges in
mass tort cases can use only the most limited tools: formal rules and
money damages. Other deeply embedded common-law tort structures militate against sound, systematic policymaking. These include
a vestigial moralism that over a century of functional critiques have
failed to displace entirely a glacial accumulation of precedents, a weak
and attenuated feedback loop, and a retrospective view transfixed
(and perhaps distorted) by the plaintiff's palpable human suffering.147 This is especially true in the mass torts context, in which the
court must confront many complex public policy issues.
But if common-law policymaking is problematic in several important respects, it also exhibits some characteristic strengths, which are
often the flip-side of its defects. The same geographical, institutional,
and analytical decentralization that hobbles systematic policymaking
in tort adjudication also stimulates innovation, especially in mass tort
cases: 148 Unbound by bad precedent in one jurisdiction, mass tort
judges and lawyers in other jurisdictions are free to eschew past errors
and undertake novel approaches to knotty problems. The small and
elite cadre of mass tort lawyers, animated by a contingency fee system
unavailable in the legal system of any other nation, 149 has particularly
strong incentives to respond quickly, resourcefully, and effectively to
any inefficiencies or inequalities resulting from misguided innovations, and to propose remedial changes. These incentives of the
bench and bar have driven the evolution of mass tort law, producing
many striking instances of both procedural and substantive innovations: market share and proportional liability, various forms of statistical adjudication, medical monitoring damages, personal injury and
settlement class actions, compensation schedules, joint federal-state
court proceedings, novel uses of adjunct court personnel, and a variety of organizational techniques. Centralized, statutory systems probatives are so compelling, and where the appellate court is often presented with a fait accompli that, however legally defective, may be effectively irreversible.
147
See Schuck, supra note 145, at 15-16.
148
I speculate that some judges in mass tort cases, such as Jack Weinstein, Robert
Parker, and Thomas Lambros, sometimes compete to be the most innovative.
149
See Fleming, supra note 81, at 520, 527.
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bly would not-and in civil law countries have not'-5 0-adopted such
innovations as quickly, or in some cases at all. The common-law system, however, facilitated not only their creation but also the refinements and new applications that followed. 151 Of course, incremental
changes-both good and bad-cumulate almost imperceptibly over
time into what amounts to a qualitatively different system. When this
occurs, legislative deliberation and negotiation-generally more comprehensive and responsive policymaking processes than common-law
adjudication-may reveal systemic problems that adjudication has
failed to resolve wisely and that therefore need to be addressed in
15 2
non-adjudicatory ways.
My point, then, is certainly not to deny a role for legislative regulation or refinement of legal regimes in general or of mass torts law in
particular. It is simply to note that the common law of mass torts is
likely to be, as a practical matter, more flexible' 53 and responsive to
contextualized litigation experience than is a statutory solution, which
legislatures will revisit only occasionally, often reluctantly, and usually
150 See Fleming, supranote 81.
151 While many judicially devised mass tort innovations have succeeded, many others
have not. Market share liability is an interesting example of the double-edged quality of
judicial innovations in mass tort actions. In principle, it is an ingenious, elegant, logically
consistent solution to an intractable problem of proof. In practice, however, litigants and
courts have found it extremely difficult to implement. In the New York DES litigation, for
example, several years and much expense were required to design an acceptable national
market share matrix, even though the parties had the advantage of being able to draw on
earlier negotiations and settlement patterns in the California DES litigation. In the end,
over 99% of the New York claims were settled before the New York matrix was even sufficiently developed to influence the settlemeni negotiations. Rheingold Interview, supra
note 7.
152 One example involves the importance of enabling class members to acquire better
information about claims values in immature and future claims mass torts settlements. See
discussion supra notes 82-119 and accompanying text. Courts have toiled fruitlessly over
this information cost problem for some time in different settlement contexts; it may now
be ripe for legislative review. See also Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The
Proliferationof Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L RErv. 2131, 2173-76 (1989) (explaining the
need to refine special master procedures). More substantive examples of legislative responses include the narrowly focused administrative compensation schemes established by
federal and state statutes. See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
153 Professor Richard Marcus correctly notes the possibility that global settlements,
which supplantjudicial supervision with a detailed structure of long-term governance, will
limit this flexibility. Letter from Richard L. Marcus, Professor of Law, Hastings College of
Law (Oct 25, 1994) (on file with author). Although it is too early to tell how the parties
will interact under these agreements over time, some flexibility may be retained if, as seems
likely, the parties may occasionally negotiate some changes (presumably with judicial approval) and invoke the arbitral or judicial forums which the agreements sometimes provide. For this reason, practice under these agreements may actually permit somewhat
more flexibility than under judicially entered consent decrees. See, e.g., David K. Fram,
Recent Development: The FalseAlarm of Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 70 CORNE.L L. RErv. 991 (1985) (examining the scope of a district court's power to modify consent
decrees).
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incrementally. 54 This common-law advantage may be especially great
during the maturationperiod of mass tort litigation which, as we have
seen with the asbestos litigation, may be quite protracted. At least in
this area, judicial policy errors are likely to be more confined than
legislative ones; more fact-specific and less systemic, judicial errors are
usually less firmly entrenched and hence easier for appellate courts
and legislatures to correct than legislative policy errors. Furthermore,
the political inertia that usually follows a legislative resolution of controversial issues tends not to afflict courts so acutely. Thus even if
courts were to err more frequently than legislatures on mass torts issues, the courts' errors might nevertheless be less persistent and less
costly to society.
2.

Normative and Symbolic Considerations

The relative advantages of developing a mass tort system through
common law courts, subject to periodic legislative review, transcend
these technocratic and instrumental considerations. These advantages also extend to the normative and symbolic realms where reifying
deeply felt, widely shared norms is of paramount importance. In such
realms, the common law's ethos matters as much as its actual performance-even when, as is sometimes the case, its ineffectiveness overshadows that ethos. In the mass torts context, two related aspects of
this common-law ethos are particularly salient: (1) commitment to
the adversary system and in particular to trial by lay jury, and (2) reliance on a nonbureaucratic mode of legitimating political authority.
a. The Adversary System and the Juy

The canonical elements of the common law model of adversary
trial-litigant-controlled proofs and proceedings, neutral and detached judging, and lay jury fact-finding-carry enormous normative
force in the American legal-political culture.' 5 5 This observation
would appear to apply a fortiori to mass torts litigation. Unlike victims
of highway collisions or other determinate harms, mass torts claimants
often can only guess at the source of their injury-an invisible chemical, a defective product, something insidious in their food, water or
154

Congress's sporadic and piecemeal review of the Superfund program is an exam-

ple. See, e.g.,John H. Cushman,Jr., CongressForegoesIts Bid to Hasten Cleanup ofDumps, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al (failure to enact Superfund amendments). In the mass torts
field, as we have seen, Congress's interventions have been both infrequent and narrowlyfocused. See Rabin, supra note 12, and text accompanying supra notes 123, 126-27.
155
For experimental evidence on this point, see E. AsL LIND r AL., THE PERCEPTION
OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEW OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989);John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory ofProcedure,66
CAL. L. RFv. 541 (1978). For professional and lay opinion about the civil jury, see Valerie
P. Hans, Attitudes toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in VERDICT. ASSESSING THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 248 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
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neighborhood, the victim's genome, or mother nature herself. Victims, finding themselves in such a profoundly perplexing and dispiriting position, often desire a knight in shining armor who will come to
their aid and ride boldly into battle on their behalf against the anonymous wrongdoers. In an increasingly bureaucratized, often incomprehensible system of justice, the plaintiffs' lawyer seems to play this
idealized role, providing a "day in court" before ajury of one's peers.
The lay jury, too, captures the American public's imagination in a
way that can scarcely be exaggerated.1 5 6 The groups with the greatest
stakes in mass tort litigation-trial lawyers, judges, and litigants-tend
to venerate the jury. 15 7 Indeed, the jury's popularity continues despite a century of sustained criticism by academics and judges and despite (or perhaps because of) a broad secular trend, extending well
beyond mass tort law, toward consolidating and collectivizing claims
that were traditionally viewed as individual. 58 The political tide propelling tort reform in virtually every state in the 1980s chipped away at
the edges of jury discretion, but left the jury's essential structure and
functions largely intact. 59 Two quite recent events-the failed effort
to amend the Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1908160 to substitute
a workers' compensation scheme for the long-standing jury-based tort
system, and the extension ofjury trials to claims alleging sex and disability discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1991' 6 1-demonstrate
that public attitudes, far from supporting reforms that would restrict
juries, strongly favor preservingand expandingthe scope of their authority. 162 "Jury reformers are so many voices crying in the political wilderness."'

68

In short, any appraisal of a litigation system in the United

States must respect the central role that the jury has been assigned
and will continue to play in the dominant public conception of
justice.
The realities of mass torts litigation, of course, sharply contradict
these luminous lay conceptions of legal representation and the day in
court. The plaintiffs' lawyer, for example, may represent thousands of
other clients whom she regards as more or less fungible, and with
whom she communicates only intermittently, impersonally, and
156 This fascination with the civil lay jury does not extend either to Britain, which has
largely abolished it in tort actions, or to civil law countries like Germany. See generaly Richard A. Posner, Juries on Tria, ComMrmETARY, Mar. 1995, at 49, 50.
157 Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate onJuty Reform, in VEicr AssEssING THE CIVIL
JuRy SmSM 329-30 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
158
See id.; see alsoJudith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation,"54LAw & Cojmrp. PROBS.
5 (1991);Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement and Dismay, 80 CoRNEiLL L. REv. 918 (1995).
159 See Schuck, supra note 157.
160 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
161 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(c), (d)
(Supp. V 1993).
162 See Schuck, supranote 157.
163 Id. at 329.
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unidirectionally. Indeed her own interests may directly conflict with
theirs, for reasons including: her powerful financial incentives to settie early, the zero-sum competition between the amount of her fee
and the funds available for compensation of clients, and her possible
64
control over the compensation fund in the event of a settlement.'
In all probability, the client's day in court will amount to a written
notice of settlement or dismissal; he may never see an Article III
judge, much less ajury of his peers;165 and if there is a hearing he will
probably not be permitted to speak. But whatever the distance between ideal and reality, the former retains overwhelming symbolic
power. Indeed, the larger the gap, the more enchanting the ideal.
b.

Non-BureaucraticAuthority

A commonplace of American legal-political culture is the fear of
concentrations of governmental power, especially in its conventional
administrative forms.' 66 For reasons that are hard to fathom, we re67
gard it as almost unthinkable, perhaps even unconstitutional,1 that
an administrative official might make decisions not reviewable by an
Article III judge. Yet, we view as authoritative and legitimate the decisions of a single judge or panel ofjudges-even when those decisions
are essentially unreviewable and hence final.' 68 These public attitudes
persist, indeed flourish, in the face of two facts which should undermine them: First, the popular, idealized image of judicial process is
seldom if ever realized, especially in mass tort litigation. Second, well164 This assumes that she works under a standard contingent fee arrangement. For a
critique of these arrangements and a proposal to reduce the conflict of interest they generate, see LESTER BicCKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES (1994).
165 Much pretrial adjudication in mass tort cases is handled by magistrates and special
masters.
166 See, e.g., JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND
THE LMIrrs OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1990); STEPHEN SKOwRONFK, BUILDING A NEw AMERICAN STATE: THE ExPANsION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982)

(examining a restructuring of American government in order to accommodate the expansion of the administrative state);James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the BureaucraticState, 41 THE
PUB. INTEREST 77 (1975) (explaining the history of and theories driving the rise of the
bureaucratic state).
167 E.g-., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 50 (1982)
(holding that Article IlI bars Congress from establishing bankruptcy courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (holding that
the Constitution restricts congressional power to replace Article IMl courts with administra-

tive courts).
168 Yeazell, supra note 70, at 647. Congress's decision in 1988 to impose political review and formal adversary process on the determination of veterans' benefits, one of the
very few administrative areas that still lacked these features, is a telling illustration of the
point. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). This
hostility to bureaucratic power is not shared by most democratic civil law countries such as
France and Germany. On the other hand, these countries seem to be gravitating slowly
toward the American model. See genera/ly MAURO CAPPELLETrI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

(1989).
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managed administrative agencies can and sometimes do achieve impressive levels of accuracy, efficiency, procedural fairness, and political accountability. 169 For present purposes, however, the important
point is that Americans are profoundly, and perhaps incorrigibly,
antibureaucratic.
The common law's distinctive appeal, then, rests in large part on
its role as a nonbureaucratic process for legitimating the exercise of
public authority. 170 Moreover, the common law's antiquity, as well as
the trappings of the civil courtroom, convey a solemnity, grandeur,
and mystery that elicit lay deference and respect, even awe. Paradoxically, although the common law's gradual accretion of precedent imparts to it an opacity that helps to insulate it from lay criticism, lay
persons seem to consider judicial rulings to be more transparent, accessible, and acceptable than the fiat of a faceless bureaucracy (to use
the common cliche). These features give the common law normative
17
and symbolic advantages over statutory and administrative law. '
Sometimes, however, circumstances can overwhelm the common
law's advantages in the mass torts area and create openings for administrative solutions. 172 In any event, although the differences between
courts and agencies are steadily narrowing, 7 3 the differences continue to operate at the crucial cognitive, symbolic, and affective levels
of lay perception. These perceptions make the emergence of a mass
tort system grounded largely in common-law institutions and practices
appear less irrational than many commentators (myself included)
have previously believed. Indeed, these lay preferences appear even
169 For the classic exposition of this point, see JE.RRY L. MASHAW, BuR.AucRAaicJusncE:: MANAGrNG SocIAL SEcuRrrv DiSABLrv CLAIMs (1983) (demonstrating the success of
bureaucracy in dealing with social security claims).
170 More accurately, its appeal rests on its erstwhile lack of bureaucracy. The growing
bureaucratization ofjudicial authority has occasioned concern among commentators. See,
e.g., IicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: Cisis AND REFORM (1985)

(surveying

changes in the federal court system); Wade H. McCree, BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warn-

ing, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (1981) (examining recent changes in the judicial process to
accommodate heavier caseloads). It is unclear, however, whether this development has
affected public attitudes toward the courts.
171 These advantages are in addition to the technocratic and instrumental advantages
noted supra part II.B.1.

See supra text accompanying notes 148-52.
Increasingly-and especially in mass tort litigation-courthouses operate like administrative offices. See supra part IA3. Many court decisions and settlement decrees are
as lengthy and detailed as agency regulations. Courts employ auxiliary staff for routine
tasks that judges need not perform. Massive records are accumulated. Even the level of
deference that courts and agencies accord to precedent may be converging. Judicial doctrines often entail sharp departures from precedent while administrative ones may be models of stare decisis. Although common law is of course not simply a matter of logical
inference pronounced by disembodied oracles, normative claims of precedent are recognized in almost all systems of law, "and agencies as well as courts routinely accept their
compelling force.
172

173
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more defensible when one considers the leading alternativestrategies
for achieving mass justice in this context
III
SELECTION

Although the mass tort system often seems chaotic and continues
to exhibit some decidedly worrisome features, it has actually evolved
into a more or less patterned system. 174 This is not a random or adventitious result; rather, the emergent system reflects a selection from
among three competing models of legal process and legitimationcommon-law, contractual, and bureaucratic. A combination of economic, ideological, institutional, and political pressures and inertias
have driven this competitive selection dynamic, resulting in an eclectic, hybrid system dominated by common-law policymaking with some
relatively narrow statutory refinements. 175
Up to this point, my discussion of the new mass tort system has
been largely descriptive. In this final Part, I briefly compare this system to three leading reform alternatives. 176 As noted in the Introduction, this comparison is merely suggestive. A rigorous, systematic
comparison would require a far more detailed specification of goals,
empirical data, and additional analysis. Such an analysis would go well
beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks to provoke institutional
comparison rather than to proselytize on behalf of any particular
177
solution.
My tentative claim, drawing on the institutional evolutionist perspective, is that despite the mass tort system's many problems, 78 it
compares rather favorably to competing models. Specifically, the system already incorporates the most valuable elements of common-law
reform proposals ("collective processing"); is perfectly consistent with
the contractual approach (a market in tort claims); and is likely to be
superior in many respects to the bureaucratic approach (administrative compensation).
A.

Collective Processing

Professor David Rosenberg has proposed what he calls a "public
law" model of mass tort litigation that would involve a number of in174

175

See supra part I.B.
See supra part I.

176 I do not wish to discuss the whole host of possible incremental reforms to the current system, some of which have already been adopted in one or more jurisdictions.
177 For a more ambitious project of institutional comparison, see NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITrTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1994), especially chap. 6 on tort reform.
178 See, e.g., Schuck, supranote 10, at 553-68.
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novative procedural techniques and doctrinal changes. 179 Rosenberg's proposals are animated by the same policy goals that have
driven the evolution of the mass torts litigation system-to improve
horizontal equity and the timeliness of compensation, to reduce transaction costs, to shift some of the burden of causal uncertainty from
claimants to defendants, and to increase deterrence of risky behavior.
I will not indulge in a belabored treatment of Rosenberg's model,
parts of which I have criticized elsewhere.' 8 0 For present purposes the
most striking feature of his model is the extent to which common-law
courts have already incorporated its main elements-class actions,
proportional liability, damage scheduling, averaged judgments, insurance-fund judgments, fee- and cost-shifting arrangements-into the
current mass tort system.' 8 ' Mass tort class actions (especially for settlement purposes) have become more common as courts attempt to
protect claimants by assuring adequate notice, by minimizing potential conflicts of interest both within classes and between claimant and
lawyers,' 8 2 and by controlling counsel fees.' 8 3 Market share liability,
84
which many courts have adopted, is a form of proportional liability.'
Forms of damage scheduling and averaged judgments have been
widely used, most notably in the Agent Orange, asbestos, and breast
implant settlements.'8 5 The global settlements in Georgine186 and the
silicone gel breast implant litigation' 8 7 include damage schedules
179
See, e.g., Rosenberg, supranote 2; David Rosenberg, Class Actionsfor Mass Torts: Doing IndividualJusticeby Collecive Means, 62 IND. LJ. 561 (1987).
180 SCHUCK, supra note 5, at 268-72.
181 Indeed, Rosenberg's writings may have partly prompted these changes. In the seminal Agent Orange fairness decision, for example, Judge Weinstein cited Rosenberg and
endorsed much of his model. Id. at 270.
182
See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness,54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1993) (discussing distributional conflicts class action lawyers must resolve). Id. at 4
n.10 (citing broadly to the legal literature and to judicial authority).
183 E.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, Civil Action No. CV 94-P11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994); In reA.H. Robins Co., 880
F.2d 709 (4th Cir.) (finding no abuse of discretion by the district court), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989); Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., Civ. Action No. 6:93CV526 (E.D. Tex.). See
also Coffee, supra note 6.
184 E.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 593 N.E.2d (N.Y.) (holding that manufacturers of
DES are severally liable to claimants in proportion to their national market share), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). Medical monitoring of damage awards based on exposure can
also be viewed as a crude form of proportional liability. See In rePaoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.,
916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 961 (1991). See also discussion supranote
151.
185 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994); In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-7-10000-S, Civil Action No. CV 94-P-1 1558-S,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
186
157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
187 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, Civil Action No. CV 94-P-11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
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which are, in effect, insurance-fund judgments for future claims. In
these settlements, fee- and cost-shifting have been achieved indirectly
and incompletely through court control and reduction of class action
costs and contingency fee awards, as well as through agreements by
defendants to bear the costs of claims processing and plaintiffs' counsel fees.
B. A Market in Tort Claims
Some scholars have urged the relaxation of traditional legal restrictions on the purchase and sale of tort claims in order to en18 8
courage the emergence of a reasonably thick market for tort claims.
These proposals seek to exploit the perceived efficiency and transaction cost advantages markets offer as compared to tort law. They also
envision some regulation of the proposed market to reduce possible
informational asymmetries between the buyers and sellers of mass tort
claims.
As to individual claims, one would expect primary markets to develop in which claimants would make initial offerings of their claims
in exchange for cash, and secondary markets in which these
purchased claims would then be aggregated and sold to others. In
such markets, one would expect private sellers of claim valuation services to emerge and compete for claimants' business. One would also
expect to see claimants being paid an amount closer to the true, timediscounted litigation value of their claims' 8 9 and receiving that payment more quickly than under the existing system. Plaintiffs' lawyers,
defendants, and insurers would be the most likely traders in secondary
markets, since they would be in the best position to estimate claim
values accurately, to efficiently trade in and settle claims, and to litigate them if necessary.
In the case of a class action, where Rule 23 requires the court to
find that the class representatives (which in practice means their lawyers) will fairly and adequately represent the class, and where the court
in practice determines which plaintiffs' lawyers will control the man188 For the main proposals in the area of tort claims, see Robert Cooter & Stephen D.
Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: Tort Reform by Contract, in Nzw
DiRErIoNs iN LAmitiy LAw 174 (Waiter Olson ed., 1988); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey

Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action andDerivative Litigation: Economic Analysis
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI L. REv. 1, 105-110 (1991); MarcJ. Shukaitis, A
Market in PersonalInjury Tort Claims, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987). Cf Thomas A. Smith, A
CapitalMarkets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE LJ. 367 (1994) (discussing the
feasibility of a market for future claims against mass tort defendants forced to liquidate or
reorganize in bankruptcy).
189 This system would minimize, if not eliminate, two problems in the current system
that were noted above-the fact that many insubstantial claims nevertheless receive significant payments, supra notes 97-98, and the risk of adverse selection in the opt-out process,
supra note 110.
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agement of the litigation, the court could convene and administer a
second kind of market, auctioning the right to represent the class.
The court would not necessarily confer class counsel status on the
highest bidder (i.e., the attorney willing to accept the lowest fee), but
would take the amounts and terms of the bids into account in making
her decision.' 9 0 This approach would have many advantages. In one
stroke, it would improve the information available to the court when
making its Rule 23 determination of adequate representation for the
class, maximize class members' net recoveries, and eliminate what is
perhaps the greatest barrier to settlement of class actions-attorneys
fee disputes. 19 1
New markets in tort claims and in class counsel status, then,
would make compensation of claimants fairer and more efficient. By
doing so, moreover, they would also tend to optimize deterrence.
This general approach would be especially desirable in the mass torts
context where there generally are higher agency and transaction
costs, higher stakes, more numerous and individualized claims, and
more uncertain claim values than in consumer and securities class
actions.
Granted, the prospect of markets in tort claims and class representation rights raise some genuine concerns. These include the danger that well-informed traders would take advantage of poorly
informed claimants, and that judges would be unable to evaluate class
representation claims on the basis of bids in an auction. But then
again, the current mass tort system suffers at least as much from these
problems as would a market system. I noted earlier that the relationships between mass torts lawyers and their clients, relationships that
are attenuated, bureaucratized, commercialized, and conflict-ridden, 192 already present formidable agency problems. Significant informational asymmetries about claim values thus exist now between
claimants and their lawyers, and between plaintiffs and defendants.
Fair net compensation to claimants under the current system is doubt190 Macey & Miller, supra note 188, at 105-10, propose ajudicialy run auction of the
power to control large-scale, small claims class actions and derivative suits. Professor Coffee has criticized this proposal on the ground that it would deter attorneys from conducting pre-filing research, since a late-comer to the auction could free ride on the
information that has been produced by others. WEINSTEIN, supranote 1, at 263. This problem, however, could be ameliorated by requiring the auction winner to compensate those
who have conducted valuable pre-filing investigation and research, perhaps at an hourly
rate augmented by a novelty premium. A similar hourly rate arrangement is part of the
proposal by BRIcXmAN Er At., supra note 164, to control abuses of the contingency fee
system.
191 Judge John Nangle recently observed that fee disputes were the main obstacle to
settling class actions. John Nangle, Remarks at Research Conference on Class Actions,
supra note 85. The implication, however, that this strengthens the policy argument for
auctioning the right to represent the class is mine, not his.
192 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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ful; even when paid, it is both skewed and slow in coming. Deterrence
is suboptimal. Judges are now even more uninformed in predicting
adequacy of representation, as they must in order to certify a class.
Thus, in all of these respects, the defects of a mass tort claims market
193
are equalled or surpassed by flaws in the traditional tort system.
Finally, each claim (or, more precisely, one-third or more of each
claim) is already "sold" in the current mass tort system. The purchaser, of course, is the claimant's contingent-fee lawyer. 194 Depending on how this lawyer finances her litigation costs, she may use part
of her share to secure further financing (which may be tantamount to
selling that part). 9 5 Despite legitimate ethical concerns about such
arrangements, invalidating them would probably deny legal representation to all but the most affluent claimants-a proposition that raises
equally profound ethical problems at least to American ways of
19 6
thinking.
Although the current contingent fee and class action financing
arrangements already effectively employ a market in tort claims,
adopting the proposed market approach would not be superfluous.
As we have just seen, existing rules now permit the sale (without calling it that) of only a fraction of the claim. More important, a variety
of procedural and ethical barriers inhibit evolutionary reform toward
a thick, fully functional market.' 9 7 Finally, of course, courts do not
currently auction the right to represent the class, despite the enormous economic value of that right both to the lawyers and to the class
members. 98 If enabled by legislative fiat, mass tort claims and class
representation markets could,, if well-regulated, readily accommodate
more complete, well-informed, and efficient trading of claims.

193 As we have seen, these problems may be ameliorated somewhat in global settlements of mature mass torts with effective back-end opt out rights that can function as a
market test on settlement claim values. See supranotes 104-13 and accompanying text.
194 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189
(1987).
195
See, e.g., SCHUCK, sura note 5, at 192-206 (discussing the fee-sharing agreement in
the Agent Orange case and the ethical issues raised by such arrangements); see also WEINSrEIN, supranote 1, at 76-82; Vincent R-Johnson, EthicalLimitationson CreativeFinancingof

Mass Tort Class Actions, 54 BRooL L. Rv. 539 (1988) (suggesting that novel features of
mass tort litigation may require that traditional fee-splitting rules be relaxed in that
context.
196 See Fleming, supra note 81.
197 Geoffrey P. Miller &Jonathan 1R Macey, Comment, A Market Approach to Tort Reform
Under Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 909, 915-17 (1995) (listing barriers).

198 The current auctioning of licenses by the Federal Communications Commission,
which is required to meet a "public interest" standard roughly comparable to the court's
obligation under Rule 23, is an obvious analogy.
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Administrative Compensation

The bureaucratic approach to personal injury compensation has
received extensive treatment in the literature, 9 9 in part because
schemes such as workers' compensation, disability insurance, and "focused" no-fault plans have been in place for a long time. Professor
Robert Rabin has recently reviewed several existing administrative
compensation programs. One is the Price-Anderson scheme for nuclear accidents, a "hybrid" plan combining tort and no-fault elements.
Another is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, a narrowly focused no-fault program that also retains a tort option. Rabin
also considers several more expansive no-fault plans that have been
proposed for toxic-related injuries, plans that would retain tort options.20 0 Each of these approaches, Rabin observes, must struggle with
the same knotty issues: defining the compensable event, setting compensation levels, deciding the degree to which compensation should
be individualized, structuring the tort system's role under the scheme,
and specifying how the system should be financed when multiple
sources of harn exist.
Rabin finds that the mass tort litigation system remains inadequate even after claims-aggregation, cost controls, and uncertainty-reducing innovations are instituted, but adds that "the superiority of a
no-fault approach is far from clear," at least where toxic-related diseases are concerned. 2 01 In such instances, no-fault schemes seem unable to grapple with causation any more effectively than does a
reformed tort system, at least so long as the scientific base remains
weak. Moreover, these issues become more problematic as the
scheme's ambit broadens. His conclusion about the advantages of administrative compensation schemes in the context of many mass torts
is decidedly guarded:
Administrative compensation schemes offer greatest promise when
the compensation-triggering "event" features a relatively clear relationship between source, substance, and pathological condition....
When one ventures, however, into the unconfined area of mass
toxic harms, administrative compensation schemes share many of

See Symposium, Future Prospectsfor Compensation Systems, 52 MD. L. REv. 893 (1993).
Rabin, supranote 12, at 955-62. It should also be noted, as Professor Abraham has
pointed out, that torts (including mass torts) comprise only a tiny portion of the serious
accidents that occur, and that creating an administrative compensation apparatus to deal
with them "would be massive overkill." Kenneth S. Abraham, IndividualAction and Collective
Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reforn, 73 VA. L REv. 845, 901 (1987).
201
Rabin, supra note 12, at 978-79. Rabin notes that workers' compensation has been
far more effective in dealing with traumatic accidents than with long-latency diseases. Id. at
980 n.107.
199

200
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the burdens
that beset a reconstructed aggregative tort liability
20 2
approach.
Several points can be drawn from Rabin's analysis. First, neither I
nor Rabin means to assert that an administrative compensation approach-whether implemented along side the mass tort system or
supplanting it altogether-could never be preferable to the status
quo. Any meaningful comparison would require significant empirical
study and theoretical refinement concerning the appropriate tradeoffs among competing social values. But given the current state of our
knowledge, the superiority of an administrative scheme to the contemporary mass tort system is highly debatable.
Second, Rabin's valuable comparison between the litigative and
administrative modes of compensation is incomplete in at least one
significant respect. Rabin rightly notes that these two modes often
interact with and complement one another; thus, he proposes to create a "switching mechanism" that would move tort claims into an administrative compensation system after litigation has reached a certain
level of maturity. 20 3 This proposal is appealing insofar as it seeks to
exploit the advantages of both systems-litigation's ability to mobilize
information about risk, causation, and other common generic issues,
and administration's ability to minimize transaction costs and reduce
extreme horizontal inequities once that information has come to
light.
Rabin's analysis, however, largely ignores the role of settlement in
mass tort litigation-which is rather like analyzing an orchestra without considering the strings. He therefore overlooks the extent to
which today's mass tort system already employs administrativemodes of compensation-afact that should inform one's comparison of the two systems. In practice, mass tort litigators "batch" claims into broad
disease groups for settlement purposes, groups that bear a striking
resemblance to the kinds of compensation categories that an administrative scheme might employ. Of course, these batches of claims will
be subject to individualizing variables, the number of which will vary
depending on the complexity of the settlement structure. The batch20 4
ing may also be distorted by the litigators' strategic considerations.
But in general, claimants in a given batch will receive roughly similar
settlement amounts-just as they would under the compensation categories that are central features of most administrative schemes.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 968-69.
See Schuck, supra note 10, at 566-67. For a pending case raising serious ethical
questions about batch settlements, see Peter Passel, Challenge to Multimilion-DollarSettlement
Threatens Top Texas Law Firm, N.Y. Tions, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. Batching also exacerbates
the problems of insubstantial claims and adverse selection discussed earlier. See supranotes
97-98, 110.
202
203
204
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The hybrid character of the mass tort system 2 05 is especially striking in the context of the global settlements in which mass tort litigation now often culminates. Indeed, these carefully negotiated
settlement plans can be viewed as more tightly drafted, more carefully
designed, more scrupulously casted, and more adequately funded versions of administrative compensation statutes. They contain detailed
definitions, decision criteria, and distribution protocols. They pro20 6
vide a mix of categorical and individualized treatment of claims.
20 7
The facilities that the plans establish to process thousands of claims
are closely modeled on administrative agencies such as workers' compensation boards. The plans assure long-term funding of the obligations to which the claims will give rise. They seek to anticipate
numerous contingencies, while prescribing alternative dispute resolution procedures for those contingencies that cannot be foreseen or
immediately resolved. 208 Indeed, in the plans' level of precision and
concern to anticipate future developments, they bear more resemblance to bond indentures than to compensation statutes.
This, of course, is no accident; it reflects systemic differences between legislation and contract regimes. When legislators address controversial subjects like compensation, they employ a variety of strategic
behaviors: ambiguous drafting, deferring difficult issues, hiding or underestimating costs, and delegating norm elaboration and implementation tasks to agencies and courts.2 0 9 These behaviors magnify the
notoriously high monitoring costs that any legislature faces in delegat2 10
ing authority to an agency.
In contrast, litigants who negotiate a global settlement are designing a structure to guide their relationship, manage their actual and
205 As Francis McGovern observes in his Comment on this Article, McGovern supra
note 45, at 1025, mass tort law can be viewed as a procedural application of Guido Calabresi's characterization of torts as "the law of the mixed society." Guido Calabresi, TorThe Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEx. L. REV. 519 (1978).

206

Civil law systems of mass torts also appear to be acquiring hybrid forms. Fleming,

supra note 81, at 519-27.
207 For a detailed examination of such facilities, see Symposium, supra note 89.
208
See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994) (Agent Orange); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157
F.RD. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (asbestos); Spitzfaden v. Dow Coming Corp., 619 So.2d 795
(La. 1993); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, Civil
Action No. CV 94-P-1 1558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (breast
implants); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 989-92 (heart valves).

209 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode4 86 CoLuM. L REv. 223, 232 & n.47 (1986) (noting
that legislatures will attempt to disguise special interest legislation to avoid losing public
support).
210

See PINCPALS AN AGENrs: THE STRucruRE OF BusINEss (John W. Pratt & Richard

J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. Rxv. 431
(1989).
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potential conflicts, administer their agreements, and distribute their
resources over a long period of time during which the incentives to
defect may be great and resort to agencies or courts may be costly and
otherwise undesirable. Most important, the parties are putting their
own money on the line. Accordingly, they take far greater pains than
do legislators in drafting the governing document to minimize future
uncertainty rather than delegating to others the responsibility for do21
ing so.

1

CONCLUSION

Mass tort litigation began to appear in the courts in the late
1960s. Since then, mass tort law has developed gradually through
trial-and-error as courts and litigants struggle to adapt traditional legal
theories and practices to what only slowly came to be seen as a novel
set of problems. The policymakers and judges of the earlier period
failed to anticipate many of the dilemmas of legal doctrine, resource
allocation, incentives, and institutional design that we now associate
with mass tort litigation. Even less predictable was the nature of the
system that would emerge in response. Indeed, only in the last decade
or so have the general contours of these difficulties become clear
enough to elicit serious scholarly attention to the relative merits of
possible solutions.
The character of the mass torts system, our understanding of it,
and the plausibility of different approaches to its reform are all affected by the path of common-law adjudication along which the system has evolved. By identifying this system with the most precious,
evocative symbols and commitments of American legal-political culture, the common law has infused mass tort litigation-for better or
for worse-with a powerful normative content and institutional support that it would have otherwise lacked.
In this sense, the common law has favored certain traditional aspects of mass tort law and practice, even as it has quietly and gradually
transformed them into a new system. The balance struck by the common law is selective and highly eclectic; it has borrowed from some
critiques and remedial approaches, while decisively eschewing others.
It has made some functional adaptations while retaining certain features that I and many others view as dysfunctional. From the institutional evolutionist perspective that I have advanced here, the
emergent system carries with it some valuable social information that
we would be foolish to ignore. The selection of this system in competition with others justifies a presumption that, all things considered, it
Nevertheless, significant agency costs continue to plague and distort the relation211
ship between mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients, especially in class actions. See
Macey & Miller, supra note 188, at 19-27.
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satisfies important social needs (not just those of the lawyers) better
than do the other approaches that have been either tried or seriously
considered. As my discussion of a market in mass tort claims suggests,
these approaches do not exhaust the universe of plausible alternatives. This presumption of functional superiority, of course, can and
should be overcome if the relevant facts (including political ones),
values, and needs change. Meanwhile, mass torts scholars should use
this selection as an invitation to disenthrall ourselves and thus to think
anew about the nature of the competing systems and about their possible reform.

